Competition in the Public School Sector: Strategic Interaction and Policy Innovation Among US School Districts by Rincke, Johannes
Competition in the Public School Sector:
Strategic Interaction and Policy Innovation
Among US School Districts
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Doktorgrades der
Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakulta¨t der Universita¨t Go¨ttingen
vorgelegt von
Johannes Rincke
aus Stuttgart.
Go¨ttingen, 2006

Videmus siquidem et ad oculum experimur, qualiter Parisius
per convocacionem et congregacionem peritorum, scientifico-
rum et prudentum Franciam irradiat et venustat, quomodo
Bononia et Padwa Italiam fortificat et exornat qualiterque
Praga Bohemiam illuminate et extollit, aut quomodo Vxonia
totam fere Almaniam clarificat et fecundat. Profecto ad hoc
summi disposicione presidii plurimarum terrarium obtinuimus
prinicipatum et Regni Polonie recepimus dyadema, ut ipsum
regnum claritate doctarum personarum illustremus, quarum
doctrinis defectus et umbras eius possemus evellere ipsumque
ceteris regionibus coequare.
STUDIUM GENERALE CRACOVIENSE A WLADISLAO
REGE POLONIAE RENOVATUR.
DIE 26 MENSIS JULII 1400
We notice that Paris, by assembling scholarly, erudite and
prudent men, is enlightening France, that Bologna and
Padova are strengthening and adorning Italy, how Bohemia
is illuminated and extolled by Prague, and that Oxford is
brightening the whole of England and is making it fruitful.
Truly, we have acceded the reign over the kingdom of Poland
and received the crown in order to enlighten the kingdom by
the glory of wise men and to eliminate by their knowledge the
shadows of poorness and insufficiency and to draw level with
other countries.
DOCUMENT OF THE RE-OPENING OF THE UNIVER-
SITY OF KRAKOW BY WÃLADYSÃLAW JAGIEÃLÃLO, KING
OF POLAND.
JULY 26, 1400
Fu¨r Len´ka und Jakob
Acknowledgements
This book contains work that was written between spring 2003 and winter
2005/06 while I was a Research and Teaching Fellow at the Centre for Eu-
ropean Economic Research (ZEW) and the Department of Economics at the
University of Mannheim. At the same time, I was also affiliated to the Uni-
versity of Go¨ttingen as a doctoral student. Along the way, many people have
helped me enormously with their advice and encouragement. The first to be
mentioned are Robert Schwager and Thiess Bu¨ttner. I have learned much
from them about modern theoretical and empirical approaches to local public
finance and urban economics, and I am grateful to them for many hours of
discussion and for their constant support.
I cannot discount the excellent training I received from many people, espe-
cially Kai A. Konrad and Ju¨rgen Wolters at the Freie Universita¨t Berlin. Nu-
merous other people at ZEW and the Universities of Mannheim and Go¨ttingen
as well as participants at various conferences and workshops have assisted me
with their comments and suggestions. Furthermore, I have benefitted from
the advice of anonymous referees for the Journal of Urban Economics and
Public Choice. A special thank goes to Jan K. Brueckner for his comments
on a paper containing an earlier version of Chapter 4. The material has been
published in the Journal of Urban Economics under the title “Competition in
the public school sector: Evidence on strategic interaction among US school
districts” (vol. 59, 352-369), and I would like to thank Elsevier Inc. for the
permission to include it in this book. Finally, Ru¨diger Go¨bel, MichaÃl Kowalik,
Emilia Maier, Andreas Schaich, Christoph Schottmu¨ller, and Falko Tabbert
have provided me with valuable research assistance. Although so many people
have helped me, any remaining errors are my own.
Munich, June 2006 Johannes Rincke

Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Strategic interaction and policy innovation . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The US school system as a laboratory for public sector
innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Summary of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 Theory: Yardstick competition and public sector innovation 19
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Incentives for public sector innovation:
A theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Analysis of equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.1 The case of a single jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.2 The case of two jurisdictions: Yardstick competition . . 29
2.4 Extension: Yardstick competition with common and
jurisdiction-specific policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix to Chapter 2: Proofs of propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Spatial effects in limited dependent variable models 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 The spatial linear probability model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 The spatial autoregressive model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Spatial effects with time lags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5 Conditioning on neighbors’ contemporaneous outcomes: The
instrumental variables probit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
v
vi
4 School choice in Michigan: Competition as a driving force for
public sector innovation 55
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 Inter-district school choice in Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 Estimation approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.4 Data, estimation and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5 Strategic interaction in school choice policies: Additional evidence 79
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2 Estimation approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.4 Estimation and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6 Spatial effects in charter school policies: Evidence from
California school districts 95
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 Background: Charter schools in California . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.3 A metric of neighborliness based on commuting flows . . . . . 98
6.4 Applying a finite spatial lag probit for panel data . . . . . . . 102
6.4.1 Estimation approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.5 Applying the instrumental variables probit . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.5.1 Estimation approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.5.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Appendix to Chapter 6: Technical description of spatial weights . . 121
7 Concluding remarks 125
References 129
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Strategic interaction and policy innovation
What causes a government or administration to adopt a new policy? In par-
ticular, what is the role of intergovernmental competition in the diffusion of
public sector innovations? Despite the fact that the research in political sci-
ence has been very active in collecting mostly descriptive material on policy
diffusion,1 relatively little is known today about the driving forces of public
sector innovation. There are basically two reasons for the unsatisfactory state
of the research on the topic. Firstly, there has been little rigorous theoretical
research on the incentives of decision makers in the public sector to experi-
ment with new policies and to adopt policy innovations invented elsewhere.
Secondly, the identification of the determinants of public sector innovation is
complicated by numerous methodological problems. As a consequence, the
number of well-crafted empirical studies is rather limited, too.
This book sheds light on one particular aspect of public sector innovation:
1Walker (1969) paved the way for comparative policy analysis. Other contributions
dealing with US state level innovations include Mintrom (1997), Caudill, Ford, Mixon Jr.,
and Peng (1995), Berry and Berry (1992), Berry and Berry (1990), Savage (1985), Canon
and Baum (1981), and Gray (1973). See Savage (1985) and Berry (1994) for surveys.
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2 Introduction
The strategic interaction among local governments in the adoption of policy in-
novations. Apart from a chapter presenting an illustrative model showing how
an immanent bias against public sector innovation and in favor of traditional
policies can be partly overcome by decentralization, the main contribution of
this book is to provide evidence on the effects of strategic interaction among
local jurisdictions on the diffusion of new programs and policies. The focus
of the empirical analysis is on the US public school system in general and the
local school districts in particular.
In the analysis of innovation activity both in the private and in the public
sector it is important to distinguish as clearly as possible between experimen-
tation and adoption or emulation. While experimentation is the search for
innovative solutions of technical problems or problems of governance, adop-
tion and emulation occurs if agents decide to use, apply or implement solutions
which are already available. Since the conditions for making use of new tech-
nologies, concepts, and policies in most cases differ across decision makers,
adoption and emulation are often risky activities in the sense that outcomes
cannot be perfectly predicted. Therefore, experimentation and adoption of
innovations often cannot be clearly distinguished conceptually. In fact, exper-
imentation can often (at least partly) be substituted by emulation, avoiding
the cost which is associated with performing policy experiments. Of course,
this aggravates the problem of distinguishing conceptually (and empirically)
between experimentation and emulation. Despite the fact that this problem
can only be solved to a limited extent in this book, the analysis focusses more
on the aspect of adoption and emulation, i.e. the diffusion of new policies
among local jurisdictions, than on policy experimentation. Empirically, this
is done by investigating adoption decisions of local school districts with regard
to policies and programs which are initiated at the state level. A well known
example is public school choice programs. Since 1987, many states in the US
have enacted school choice laws allowing the school districts to decide whether
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they allow resident students to choose a school other than their neighborhood
school within the school district (intra-district choice) or whether they admit
non-resident students at the local public schools (inter-district choice). The
school districts’ adoption decisions in this kind of state-initiated programs can
be understood as participation decisions. The data describing the diffusion
of this kind of policy innovations used in the empirical analyses confirm the
expectation that payoffs from adopting new policies are uncertain even if the
policy has not been invented by the adopting jurisdiction: Some school dis-
trict adopt a new policy and abandon it a few periods later. Other districts
start with a low level of innovation activity at some point in time and increase
the level of innovation activity later on, suggesting that experimenting with a
policy invented and adopted elsewhere provides useful information.
When thinking about strategic interaction among local governments with
regard to public sector innovation, there are two classes of models which should
be considered. The first class addresses the flows of the factors of production
and residential choices between jurisdictions as the source of interaction among
local governments. The second class focusses on the political decisions of res-
idents as voters and derives interdependencies in local governments’ decisions
and behavior in a principal-agent framework with asymmetric information
between the local government and the residents.
The classical contribution in the first class is Tiebout (1956). Examples
for the widespread application of the framework both in theoretical and em-
pirical terms are inter-jurisdictional tax competition and the capitalization of
locally provided public goods and services. With respect to the allocation of
mobile capital, the underlying idea is that the corresponding flows between
jurisdictions reflect differentials in the net rate of return. Since taxes on cap-
ital income affect the net return, tax rates are natural instruments for local
governments with taxing authority to compete for mobile capital. In a de-
centralized setting, the choice of tax rates involves a fiscal externality. This
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externality makes the setting of tax rates interdependent across jurisdictions
and leads to the well known fact of underprovision of local public goods.2
Models addressing Tiebout choice and capitalization effects rest on the fact
that residential choices depend on the quantity and quality of locally provided
services, amenities, and property prices. Each local jurisdiction is character-
ized by certain amenities and provides a specific bundle of local public goods.
Households sort such that their utility is maximized, taking property prices
into account. In this setting, as in the tax competition example, decisions in
one jurisdiction will exert an externality on other jurisdictions: Changes in the
bundle of public goods provided in one jurisdiction will induce relocation deci-
sions of some households and thereby affect property values elsewhere. Since
public sector innovations can be seen as a change in the way the public sector
achieves the provision of goods and services, models involving Tiebout choice
provide ample opportunity to modelling strategic interaction among local gov-
ernments in the adoption of policy innovations. However, there is virtually no
literature on Tiebout models focussing on public sector innovation.
The most seminal contribution in the second class of models is Besley and
Case (1995). The paper addresses the agency problem between political rep-
resentatives and voters and shows how comparative performance evaluation
by voters can drive local governments into yardstick competition.3 Apply-
ing the model to tax setting in the US states, the authors provide evidence
supporting the view of yardstick competition as a discipline enhancing mech-
anism. The idea of comparative performance evaluation is applicable quite
2The landmarks in the theoretical tax competition literature are Wilson (1986), Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986), and Wildasin (1989). For a survey, see Wilson (1999).
3The fundamental idea of yardstick competition in the public sector is borrowed from
earlier studies in the industrial organization and contest theory literature. See Holmstrom
(1982) for a general treatment and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) for an application to labor
market tournaments.
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generally and lends itself to modelling the effects of yardstick competition on
the incentives of governments to adopt or experiment with new policies. The
model presented in Chapter 2 is a straightforward example, focussing on the
implementation of political best-practice technologies.
Approaches based on Tiebout choice and yardstick competition models
share the common feature that they quite naturally lead to predictions saying
that decentralization promotes public sector innovation, and that the adop-
tion of a new policy in one jurisdiction increases the probability of adoption
in competing jurisdictions. Empirically, this would be reflected in adoption
decisions to be positively spatially correlated. Focussing on the issue of pol-
icy experimentation, recent research has put forward the concern that learn-
ing externalities could prevent agents from experimenting at an efficient level
(Strumpf, 2002, Bolton and Harris, 1999). In general, the presence of learn-
ing externalities challenges the traditional view that decentralized systems of
government provide natural laboratories for public sector innovation.4 To the
extent that the diffusion of policy innovations is driven by adoption decisions
with uncertain outcomes, the concerns about free-riding incentives carry over
from policy experimentation to policy diffusion. As mentioned above, the
problem of distinguishing between experimentation and adoption cannot be
perfectly solved in this book. However, the empirical results point to positive
interdependencies among adoption decisions irrespective of whether contem-
poraneous decisions or decisions involving time lags are considered. This can
be interpreted as evidence suggesting that the effect of learning externalities
on the behavior of local governments towards public sector innovation is dom-
inated by incentives to adopt innovative policies which are (expected to be)
used elsewhere.
Methodologically, the empirical parts of the book are closely related to the
4See Oates (1999) for a broad discussion of the issue.
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vast and growing literature on strategic interaction among jurisdictions. The
literature is surveyed by Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005). Most contribu-
tions have focussed on strategic interaction in tax rates (e.g, see Besley and
Case (1995), Brett and Pinkse (1997), Hayashi and Boadway (2000), Bu¨ttner
(1999, 2001), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Rev-
elli (2003), and Egger, Pfaffermayr, and Winner (2005)) and expenditures
(e.g, see Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993), Baicker (2005) and Revelli (2006)).
Bu¨ttner (2003) extends this literature by providing evidence on fiscal external-
ities of taxing decisions of local jurisdictions. Interaction in non-fiscal policy
instruments has been addressed by Brueckner (1998), dealing with growth
controls in California cities, and in a study on environmental policies of the
US states by Fredriksson and Millimet (2002).
1.2 The US school system as a laboratory for public
sector innovation
When I started doing research on public sector innovation in decentralized sys-
tems of government, I was happy to discover that the US public school system
provides a sort of laboratory for the decentralized provision of public goods
and services. This laboratory offers excellent conditions for empirical research
on various topics such as tax and expenditure competition, the technical and
allocative efficiency of public goods provision, capitalization of quality and
quantity of publicly provided goods and services in property values, and the
determinants of policy experimentation and public sector innovation.
At the local level, the public school system is administrated and main-
tained by local school districts. As a special-purpose district, a school district
is a unique body corporate and politic, and its sole responsibility is to op-
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erate the local public primary and secondary schools. Its legislative body,
elected by direct popular vote, is called a school board, board of trustees,
or school committee, and this body appoints a superintendent to function as
the district’s chief executive for carrying out day-to-day decisions and policy
implementations.
The functioning of a school district can be a key influence and concern
in local politics. A well run district with safe and clean schools, graduating
enough students to good colleges and universities, can enhance the value of
housing in its area.5 This will directly benefit local residents and, at the same
time, increase the amount of property tax revenue available to carry out the
school district’s operations. Conversely, a poorly-run district will adversely af-
fect local residents. The importance of the quality of the local public schools
both in terms of the students’ labor market prospects and with respect to
housing values results in a close monitoring of school district operations by lo-
cal residents.6 This, in particular, makes the school district level an attractive
choice when testing implications and hypotheses about strategic behavior of
local governments.
Another attractive fact supporting the choice of US school districts as
the units of observation in empirical studies on public sector activities is the
availability of exceptionally rich data. The first source to mention is the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). It provides various data
bases covering a variety of district characteristics on an annual basis and,
in addition, conducts surveys on school district policies. Another valuable
5The capitalization of the quality of local public schools is well documented. See,
for instance, Bradbury, Mayer, and Case (2001), Weimer and Wolkoff (2001), Bogart and
Cromwell (2000, 1997), Colwell and Guntermann (1984), Gill (1983), Jud and Watts (1981),
and Clotfelter (1975).
6When the General Social Survey in 1987 asked respondents to name the head of the
local school system, 31% gave the correct answer.
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source is the Bureau of the Census. It provides a huge variety of population
and housing characteristics at the district level. Both the NCES data bases
and the Census data cover all local school districts throughout the US. Finally,
the Departments of Education of various states provide excellent data bases
on their public elementary and secondary schools and school districts. Such
state specific data sources are of tremendous importance for many empirical
research projects because they often provide highly disaggregated data on test
scores from standardized achievement tests. Using this data, it is possible to
construct measures for the quality of education offered by the local public
school sector.
To give a first impression of the characteristics of local school districts
in the US, descriptive statistics for 12,556 districts in 2003/04 are given in
Table 1.1.7 Presently, a typical US school district operates about six schools,
serving around 3000 students. The variation in district size is huge. The
smallest district has one school serving a single student, while the largest
district, Los Angeles City Unified, runs near to 700 schools with almost 750,000
students. The student-teacher ratio shows considerable variation, too, with a
mean of 14.4. Public schools in the US receive funding from three different
sources. On average, federal funds amount to 8 percent of all revenues, state
funds cover about 50 percent, and local sources contribute around 42 percent
to total revenues. Taken together, the typical school district has about 10,000
dollars of revenue per student. Again, there is huge variation in revenues per
student. The numbers also imply that the average district has a budget of
about 30 million dollars.
The Bureau of the Census sorts school districts into seven categories with
7The NCES Common Core of Data lists 14,472 local school districts for the 2003/04
school year. I have dropped districts from Alaska and all districts with missing values
for some of the variables displayed. In addition, a number of non-operative districts and
districts with a zero number of students or teachers have been eliminated.
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Table 1.1: US local school districts in 2003/04, descriptive statistics (Nob=12,556)
Mean S.D. Min Max
Enrollmenta 2.95 10.4 0.001 747
Number of schools 5.92 13.4 1.00 693
Student-teacher ratio 14.4 3.75 1.00 64
Total revenues per studentb 9.86 4.38 0.668 114
Share of federal revenues 0.080 0.072 0 0.835
Share of state revenues 0.496 0.186 0 1.00
Share of local revenues 0.424 0.207 0 0.999
Large city 0.011 0.106 0 1.00
Mid size city 0.039 0.194 0 1.00
Urban fringe of large city 0.159 0.366 0 1.00
Urban fringe of mid-size city 0.094 0.291 0 1.00
Large town 0.007 0.085 0 1.00
Small town 0.114 0.318 0 1.00
Rural 0.392 0.488 0 1.00
Elementary school district 0.222 0.416 0 1.00
High school district 0.035 0.184 0 1.00
Unified school district 0.743 0.437 0 1.00
a In 1000 students.
b In 1000 $ and 2003 prices.
regard to urbanicity, ranging from ‘Large city’ to ‘Rural’. Only one percent
of the school districts is categorized as being located in a large city, while 4
percent are located in mid-size cities. With 16 percent, ‘Urban fringe of large
city’ is the category with the second highest frequency. About 9 percent of
all districts are located in the urban fringe of mid-size cities, while roughly 50
percent belong to one of the remaining categories. 11 percent are categorized
as small-town districts, while 39 percent are classified as rural.
In many states, some districts are specialized to operating only elemen-
tary or secondary schools. While a majority of 74 percent are unified school
districts serving both elementary and secondary schools, 22 percent of all US
school districts are elementary and 3.5 percent are high school districts.
Instead of analyzing public sector innovation at the local level, one could,
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in principle, also look at the level of states or provinces or even investigate
adoption decisions with an international perspective. As mentioned above,
there is a strong tradition of policy diffusion research beginning with Walker
(1969), and most authors have used data on state policies in the US to pro-
duce empirical evidence on the determinants of public sector innovation.8 A
particular problem of these studies is the high degree of inertia in the political
process which is usually present at higher level tiers of government. Techni-
cally, this is often reflected in positive adoption decisions with regard to some
new policy or some newly invented model of governance being made once and
for all: For each unit of observation, one can observe only a single switch
towards the new policy (given that the new policy is adopted at all). This
puts severe limits on the set of empirical models and techniques which might
be used to investigate the determinants of adoption. At the local level, the
political process seems to be much more flexible, and we regularly observe
jurisdictions experimenting with new policies. Of course, ‘experimenting’ in
the true sense means that new policies will proof inadequate in some cases.
Consequently, at the local level we observe governments abandoning newly
implemented policies. The resulting pattern of adoption decisions is much
richer, and often the variation in observed policy choices can be exploited
using a broad variety of cross-section and panel data methods.
8In addition to the studies cited in footnote 1, see Coughlin, Garrett, and Herna´ndez-
Murillo (2003) and Garret, Wagner, and Wheelock (2003) for recent approaches using an-
alytical instead of descriptive techniques. Another interesting contribution is Boockman
(2001), analyzing the behavior of national governments in the ratification of international
conventions.
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1.3 Summary of results
The remainder of the book is divided into five chapters, one providing a the-
oretical analysis of public sector innovation and four dealing with testing for
strategic interaction in the adoption of policy innovations.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical model of public sector innovation in a
decentralized system of governments. In a setting with two jurisdictions, local
governments have to choose between an old and a new policy with stochastic
payoffs. There are two types of governments, benevolent and rent-seeking. For
governments, it is costly to run the new policy in terms of administrative effort,
and rent-seeking governments therefore have an incentive to run the old policy
irrespective of the payoffs generated by both policies. There is asymmetric
information between governments and voters with respect to policy payoffs:
While governments are perfectly informed about policy payoffs for their own
jurisdiction, voters can only observe payoffs net of transfers governments make
to themselves. It is therefore difficult for the voters to distinguish a benevolent
government operating under unfavorable circumstances from a rent-seeking
government playing a mimicking strategy.
The model is used to illustrate that in correlated environments yardstick
competition between governments of local jurisdictions may be a driving force
for the diffusion of policy innovations. The intuition for this result is straight-
forward: Under yardstick competition it is more difficult for rent-seeking gov-
ernments to maintain a sufficiently good reputation to be reelected. If it is
optimal to use the new policy from a social perspective, benevolent govern-
ments will do so, and rent-seeking governments will be forced to follow in order
to protect their reputation.
While other contributions dealing with public sector innovation discuss the
incentives to experiment with new policies (see, for instance, Strumpf (2002),
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Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006a), and Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006b)),
the model presented in Chapter 2 focusses on the incentives to implement po-
litical best-practice technologies in situations where policies maximizing the
politician’s utility differ from policies maximizing social welfare. This is rel-
evant for public sector innovation since running new policies often requires
higher effort. Politicians can earn rents by avoiding extra effort and by run-
ning traditional policies disproportionately often. The model shows how the
resulting bias against pubic sector innovation can be alleviated by comparative
performance evaluation.
The yardstick competition model of public sector innovation has a clear
empirical implication. In order to learn about political best-practice technolo-
gies, citizens must collect and review information about the performance of
several local governments. Since the costs will increase with the number of
jurisdictions under monitoring, residents can be expected to use only a lim-
ited number of reference jurisdictions as a yardstick for policies in their own
jurisdiction. Since the equilibrium with yardstick competition predicts local
adoption decisions to positively depend on expected adoptions in reference
jurisdictions, the model predicts positive spatial correlation in the adoption
of public sector innovations across jurisdictions. Moreover, when dealing with
local jurisdictions such as the US school districts, it is reasonable to think
of reference or neighboring jurisdictions as being determined (at least partly)
by geographical proximity. The reason is that, given that the number of po-
tential reference jurisdictions at the local level is large and that monitoring
and information costs increase with geographical distance, residents as well as
policymakers will find it useful to refer to jurisdictions which are close to their
own jurisdiction.9
9Local jurisdictions in large urban areas may be an exemption, since the number of
reference jurisdictions is limited by the small overall number of such urban areas and infor-
mation on the local public sector is often more readily available.
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Chapter 3 gives an overview over empirical models with limited dependent
variables incorporating spatial effects. However, the overview is not meant
to be exhaustive. Rather, it aims at introducing the empirical models used
in the chapters presenting empirical results on strategic interaction in public
sector innovation. Four models are described and discussed: The spatial au-
toregressive probit, a latent variable model with time-lagged spatial effects, a
probit model conditioning on neighbors’ contemporaneous outcomes, and the
spatial linear probability model. Advantages and disadvantages of all models
are discussed, and estimation procedures are delineated. Further details and
particular questions which arise in applying the models to specific estimation
problems are discussed in Chapters 4 to 6.
Chapter 4 is the first out of three chapters presenting evidence on spatial
effects in the adoption of policy innovations. The analysis revolves around the
question how increased competition for mobile resources among jurisdictions
affects the willingness of local governments to make use of new administrative
concepts and regulations. In particular, I investigate how increased competi-
tion among local school districts affects the attitude of local decision makers
to adopt school choice policies which, effectively, contribute to increased in-
tegration of local educational markets. The empirical analysis makes use of
a significant change in the institutional environment of the public school sec-
tor in Michigan in 1996, when a voluntary inter-district choice program was
established. Under this program, students were given the right to enroll at
public schools outside their district of residence. Local school districts would
not be forced to accept non-resident students, but districts participating in the
choice program and allowing for the enrollment of transfer students would re-
ceive additional state funds depending on the number of non-resident students
enrolled.
The evidence on interdependencies among the school districts’ policies to-
wards school choice is based on the districts’ participation decisions in the
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second year of the program. The analysis exploits the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the degree of competition for non-resident students which resulted
from the initial participation decisions of all districts and demonstrates that
the districts’ readiness to adopt the new policy was positively affected by com-
petition of neighboring districts. The school districts’ reaction to increased
competition for students and resources can be described as a sort of ’striking
back’ behavior, i.e. the districts were more likely to compete for non-resident
students if neighboring districts did so. The results suggest that the school
districts did use participation in the inter-district choice program to actively
engage in competition for students and resources. Facing increased risk of los-
ing students and resources, the school districts seem to have flexibly reacted to
competition from neighboring districts. The results also suggest that the im-
pact of neighbors’ decisions on the participation probability was substantial,
and that competition for students contributed significantly to the increase in
the share of districts allowing for inter-district transfers from 37 percent in
1996/97 to more than 70 percent in 2002/03.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of interaction in the adoption of policy in-
novations among US school districts. Again, the focus is on the adoption of
inter-district school choice. As in the Michigan case study, the variation in
choice policies at the school district level is exploited by focussing on the dis-
tricts’ adoption decisions in states where participation is voluntary. However,
the approach differs in several aspects from the one in Chapter 4. Firstly,
the evidence on behavioral convergence in school choice policies is based on a
unique data set providing information on district characteristics and policies
in a large sample of districts covering five US states. Secondly, instead of mod-
elling the interaction in adoption decisions as spatial dependence involving a
time lag as in Chapter 4, the analysis allows for contemporaneous correlation
in the districts’ predispositions towards adoption of school choice.
Controlling for a large number of district characteristics describing lo-
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cal preferences and for spatial correlation in errors, the results indicate that
the school districts’ predispositions towards policies of open enrollment are
strongly interdependent. Districts which are exposed to a composite neighbor
with a strong predisposition towards adoption are significantly more likely
to participate. Thus, similarly situated school districts indeed tend to affect
each other in the decision whether to adopt new political technologies. The
results of the chapter thus extend and confirm the evidence on positive spatial
correlation in school choice policies among US school districts.
Chapter 6 is devoted to the empirical analysis of charter school policies.
Charter schools are public schools operating independently from the exist-
ing school district structure. They are exempt from many state and district
regulations and provide school officials and teachers with additional profes-
sional opportunities. By providing additional choice for parents and students,
charter schools also tend to increase competition in the public school system.
As in the previous chapters, the focus is on district level policies. The
aim of the chapter is to provide evidence on strategic interaction among lo-
cal school districts in setting their charter school policies. The evidence is
based on charter school policies of California school districts after the state
legislature enacted a charter school law in 1992. The empirical investigation
is based on two different approaches. The first approach is a finite spatial
lag model based on the spatial autoregressive model proposed by Case (1992)
and discussed in Section 3.3. Several extensions of the original model are pro-
posed. Firstly, the model is applied to panel data of innovations instead of
pure cross-section data. This makes it possible to model both dynamic and
spatial effects and allows to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Secondly,
a finite spatial lag version of the spatial autoregressive model is used. This, in
contrast to the original model, allows to experiment with various spatial struc-
tures. The second approach is a spatial instrumental variables probit model
as described in Section 3.5. In contrast to the finite spatial lag model, the in-
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strumental variables probit is not applied to panel data, but to cross-sections
of the California school districts.
The chapter adds to the existing literature not only by proposing empirical
models which have not previously been used to estimating spatial effects in
limited dependent variable models, but also by suggesting a new metric of
neighborliness for local jurisdictions. The metric accounts for the small-scale
mobility of workers in terms of district-to-district commuting flows. The in-
tuition for this metric is simple: For each district, a set of reference districts
is defined. It consists of all districts which are in sufficiently similar commut-
ing distance to the average commuter workplace. For the reference districts,
the degree of neighborliness is determined according to differences in median
household income. The proposed metric clearly outperforms metrics relying
on simple measures of geographical proximity. Most importantly, the impact
of neighbors on actual district policies towards charter schools is estimated
much more precisely.
The evidence provided in Chapter 6 suggests that the diffusion of charter
schools as a new form of public schooling provision is heavily affected by posi-
tive interdependencies among the districts’ decisions to establish and operate
charter schools. For instance, based on the instrumental variables probit, a
one percentage point increase in the share of neighbors operating at least one
charter school is estimated to increase the original district’s probability to run
charter schools by 0.43 to 0.59 percentage points.
When modelling the mechanisms setting incentives for local governments to
adopt public sector innovations and to implement political best-practice tech-
nologies, one can either focus on the political process or on (re-)location de-
cisions of households and firms. Both traditional models with Tiebout choice
and models focussing on the political process in a setting with asymmetric in-
formation between local governments and residents imply adoptions of policy
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innovations to show positive spatial correlation. The main contribution of this
book is to show that the interaction among local governments with regard to
public sector innovation is not only a prediction of theoretical models, but a
powerful real world phenomenon.

Chapter 2
Theory: Yardstick competition and public
sector innovation
2.1 Introduction
The political agency problem between voters and their elected representatives
is of fundamental importance. The core of this problem is a severe infor-
mational asymmetry: Representatives are better informed than voters about
the prospects of all kind of public projects as well as the costs of provid-
ing public goods and services. Furthermore, the ability of voters to monitor
their representatives is limited, too. Thus investments in wasteful projects,
favors to special interests and rent-seeking by politicians often cannot be dis-
tinguished from benevolent and honest political activities under unfavorable
circumstances. Repeated elections are the basic means the electorate can use
to sort the bad representatives from the good. But given that it is difficult for
voters to assess the performance of their representatives and to distinguish be-
tween bad performance and bad luck, elections alone clearly do not work well
as a discipline device for politicians. In decentralized political systems, how-
ever, voters may base their decision at the ballot box on comparative rather
than absolute performance (or both). In correlated environments, inference
on the quality of a jurisdiction’s performance will be more precise if it is based
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on a performance comparison across several jurisdictions. In their strategic
interaction with the electorate, representatives will anticipate the comparative
performance evaluation and adjust their behavior.
In this chapter, the role of yardstick competition in the diffusion of pub-
lic sector innovations is addressed from a theoretical perspective. I offer a
simple model with two jurisdictions where governments face the alternative
to choose between an old and a new policy with stochastic payoffs. There
are two types of governments, benevolent (‘good’) and rent-seeking (‘bad’).
Running the new policy is costly in terms of additional effort needed to per-
form it, and rent-seeking governments therefore have an incentive to run the
old policy irrespective of the payoffs generated by both policies. The model
is used to illustrate that yardstick competition between governments of local
jurisdictions may be a driving force for the diffusion of policy innovations in
decentralized political systems. The intuition for this result is straightforward:
Under yardstick competition it is more difficult for rent-seeking governments
to maintain a sufficiently good reputation to be reelected. If it is optimal to
use the new policy from a social perspective, benevolent governments will do
so, and rent-seeking governments will be forced to follow in order to protect
their reputation.
Of course, comparative performance evaluation is costly for voters in terms
of collecting and processing information. Residents in any given jurisdiction
can therefore be expected to use only a limited number of reference jurisdic-
tions as a yardstick to evaluate policies in their own jurisdiction.1 Hence,
the model predicts yardstick competition between local jurisdictions’ govern-
ments to make local decisions in the adoption of policy innovations depending
on expected policies in a composite ‘neighboring’ jurisdiction. Empirically,
1Reference districts may be determined by the degree of neighborliness such as spatial
proximity, but other criteria like the degree of similarity of social and economic conditions
or factor mobility between jurisdictions may also play a role.
Theory: Yardstick competition and public sector innovation 21
this would be reflected in public sector innovations being positively spatially
correlated across jurisdictions.
The chapter is related to a number of theoretical papers on political agency
problems. In one of the fundamental contributions in the field, Besley and
Case (1995) introduced the idea of yardstick competition between jurisdic-
tions. They show how in correlated environments the asymmetric information
problem between politicians and voters can be alleviated by comparative per-
formance evaluation across jurisdictions. Other contributions that deal with
the role of yardstick competition in political agency problems include Besley
and Smart (2002), who discuss the effect of yardstick competition on public
good provision and wasteful spending, Belleflamme and Hindriks (2005), ex-
tending the contribution of Coate and Morris (1995) on inefficient rent-seeking
to a multi-agency framework, and Wrede (2001), who provides a model with
rent-seeking politicians and yardstick competition in a more richly modelled
political system. This chapter extends the model of Besley and Case (1995)
to allow for strategic interaction between jurisdictions with respect to policy
innovations as discrete choice decisions. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006b)
discuss the effect of outside information on the incentives to experiment with
innovative public policies. They show that outside information is a two-sided
edge: it is beneficial since it helps the voter to separate selfish from benevo-
lent politicians, but it also creates an externality that reduces the incentives
to engage in policy experiments. In a recent contribution, Kotsogiannis and
Schwager (2006a) discuss the effect of career concerns of politicians in federal
systems on their willingness to experiment with new policies. In another theo-
retical paper, Bolton and Harris (1999) deal with strategic interaction among
players who must divide their time between safe and risky actions. Agents
can learn from the current experimentation of others, giving rise to a free-rider
problem. On the other hand, agents may be encouraged to experiment more
if, by doing so, they can bring forward the time at which the beneficial ef-
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fects from increased experimentation of all agents become available. Mukand
and Rodrik (2002) provide a model of policy choice in ‘follower’ countries,
where governments can either choose a policy which was successfully imple-
mented in some other country or they can experiment and rely on a private
signal about the appropriate policy in their own country. The effects of the
informational externality created by successful leaders depends on the degree
of similarity between leader and follower: Followers whose state is close to
the leader benefit from mimicking the leader. In the ‘near periphery’ this
causes countries to adopt policies which are often inappropriate to their cir-
cumstances. In contrast, countries in the ‘far periphery’ tend to experiment
on their own since the informational externalities are too weak to outweigh the
costs associated with choosing inappropriate policies. Tyran and Sausgruber
(2005) report on an experimental study on policy experimentation and pol-
icy diffusion. The experimental design allows to discriminate between policy
experimentation, experience, and policy emulation as factors driving the dif-
fusion process. The main result of the study is that experimentation by itself
leads to an inefficiently low innovation rate, and that policy emulation, by
significantly contributing to the spread of the policy innovation, is efficiency
enhancing.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the
theoretical framework is presented. Section 2.3 is devoted to the discussion of
the yardstick competition equilibrium and the reference equilibrium without
yardstick competition. An extension of the basic model with jurisdiction-
specific and common policies in presented in Section 2.4. Finally, the empirical
implications of the model are derived and discussed in Section 2.5.
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2.2 Incentives for public sector innovation:
A theoretical model
Consider two jurisdictions i = 1, 2. Each jurisdiction is populated by a rep-
resentative resident and has a government which performs a public policy pi
generating a payoff pii. Governments face the alternative to choose between an
old policy o and a new policy n. Assume that a special effort e > 0 is needed to
perform the new policy.2 Governments are either benevolent or rent-seeking.
Rents take the form of transfers τi governments make to themselves. Bad
governments’ per-period utility ui(pi, τi) is τi − e if pi = n and τi if pi = o.
The model has two time periods, where utility derived in the second period
is discounted with the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The timing of events is as
follows. At the beginning of period 1, Nature draws three random variables
s ∈ {l, h} and Si ∈ {L,H}, i = 1, 2. These variables determine the pay-
offs governments can produce by selecting a policy. They will be discussed
shortly. In addition, Nature draws for each jurisdiction the type of an incum-
bent government Ii ∈ {G,B}, where G stands for ‘good’ and B for ‘bad’, i.e.
rent-seeking. After all random variables have been drawn, incumbents in both
jurisdictions simultaneously choose a pair (pi, τi). Policy payoffs are realized,
and the utility vi = pii − τi is delivered to the voters. At the end of period
1, elections take place. In each jurisdiction, the resident either reelects the
incumbent or chooses a challenger who is drawn from the same distribution
as incumbents. The voting is retrospective, and resident-voters care about
maximizing their period-2 utility. In period 2, governments (either reelected
incumbents or newly elected challengers) once again choose a policy and a
transfer to themselves.
2One could see e as the effort needed to perform the new policy in excess of the effort
needed to perform the old policy.
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Table 2.1: Policy payoffs
Superior policy old policy (s = l) new policy (s = h)
negative positive negative positive
Jurisdiction-specific shock (S = L) (S = H) (S = L) (S = H)
Payoff old policy pi pi +∆ pi pi +∆
Payoff new policy pi − 2∆ pi −∆ pi + 2∆ pi + 3∆
The policy payoffs are determined as follows. Depending on the outcome
for the jurisdiction-specific random variable Si, the payoff from the old policy
is either pi (if Si = L) or pi+∆ (if Si = H). The payoff from the new policy is
jurisdiction-specific and is jointly determined by s and Si. The outcome for s
determines, jointly for both jurisdictions, whether the new policy is superior
to the old policy. If s = h, then the new policy generates higher payoff than
the old policy, and payoffs are pi + 2∆ (if Si = L) or pi + 3∆ (if Si = H). If
s = l, the new policy generates lower payoff than the old policy, and payoffs
are pi − 2∆ (if Si = L) or pi −∆ (if Si = H). Table 2.1 gives an overview of
payoffs.
Let θ be the probability that the old policy is superior, i.e. that s = l,
and γ be the probability that a good incumbent is drawn in jurisdiction i.
The draws of I1 and I2 are independent. The degree of correlation among the
shocks S1 and S2 is measured by the parameter σ. Denoting by Pr(X, Y ) the
joint probability that jurisdiction i is hit by a shock Si = X, while j is hit by
a shock Sj = Y , we have
Pr(L,L) = qσ; Pr(L,H) = Pr(H,L) = q(1−σ); Pr(H,H) = 1−q(2−σ).
Thus q is a jurisdiction’s (unconditional) probability of experiencing a shock
S = L. Since the model is not meant to deal with the case of negative
correlation between S1 and S2, let σ be restricted by σ ∈ [q, 1]. With σ =
1 we have perfect correlation among shocks, whereas with σ = q we have
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independence.3
To simplify the analysis, the transfer is restricted to τ ∈ {0,∆, τ¯}, where
τ¯ is the maximal transfer.4 In addition, let τ¯ > ∆ > e as well as τ¯ < 3∆.
The former assumption means that the model allows for transfers exceeding
the difference between the high and the low payoff given a realization of s and
a certain policy, and that choosing the new policy and taking a transfer that
equals this difference generates a positive per-period utility for incumbents.
To get an intuition for the latter assumption, consider two situations in which
the new policy is being implemented. In the first situation, let the new policy
also be the superior policy. Note that in this situation the lowest possible
per-period utility of the voter is pi+2∆− τ¯ . Now consider a second situation
where the new policy is being implemented despite the fact that the old policy
is superior. Note that in this situation the highest possible per-period utility
is pi −∆. The assumption τ¯ < 3∆ guarantees that, if the new policy is being
used, it will always be possible for the voter to learn about the superior policy.
To complete the description of the model, the distribution of information
has to be specified. All underlying distributions are common knowledge. The
draws of s and Ii, i = 1, 2 are revealed to both jurisdictions’ incumbents. Thus
each incumbent knows which policy is superior, its own type and the type of
the other jurisdiction’s incumbent. As mentioned by Besley and Case (1995),
who use the same assumptions with regard to the knowledge of incumbents’
types, this is a bit too strong. However, for the main implication of the model
to go through it would be sufficient to assume that incumbents know more
about each other than voters do. This seems to be reasonable, given that
decision makers interact with each other to some extent. It is also worth
noting that the empirical implication of the model with regard to the spatial
3This density has been used by Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2004).
4The assumption that the choice of transfers is discrete is not restrictive. With τ ∈ [0, τ¯ ]
instead the crucial properties of the equilibria discussed in the following are the same.
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distribution of policy innovations critically depends on this assumption.
Furthermore, each incumbent observes the realization of Si in his own
jurisdiction. Thus, when simultaneously choosing policies and transfers, in-
cumbents in both jurisdictions are perfectly informed about the payoff their
own policy will generate. With regard to payoffs in the other jurisdiction,
incumbents know which policy is superior and the distribution of payoffs con-
ditional on the incumbent’s choice. Residents in both jurisdictions do not
know neither incumbents’ types nor the realizations of s and Si, i = 1, 2.
What residents observe is the policy in their own jurisdiction and their own
utility, i.e. the policy payoff net of the transfer taken by the incumbent. If
we allow for yardstick competition, residents also observe the policy and the
resident’s utility in the other jurisdiction.
2.3 Analysis of equilibria
2.3.1 The case of a single jurisdiction
Without yardstick competition, there is no link between both jurisdictions.
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium described in proposition 1 is thus an equi-
librium in the behavior of incumbents and resident-voters if we look at each
of both jurisdictions separately. Denote the strategies of incumbents5 by
µ[s, Si, Ii] = (pi, τi). The strategies of residents as voters are given by ς(pi, vi) ∈
[0, 1], denoting the probability that they reelect an incumbent who sets policy
pi and delivers utility vi. As usually, along the equilibrium path the underlying
beliefs with regard to the incumbent’s type are tied down by the requirement
5Strictly speaking this labelling is not correct, since second period choices of govern-
ments are not described. These are trivial, however, and the chapter follows the literature
in suppressing them from what is called incumbents’ strategies.
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that the beliefs must be computed from the incumbent’s strategy via Bayes’s
rule.
With respect to out-of-equilibrium beliefs of voters the following simple
rule is specified: Whenever it is apparent that a transfer has been taken
and/or it is apparent that the inferior policy has been chosen in i, the voter
in i believes that a bad incumbent holds office.6 As in many other signalling
games, different out-of-equilibrium beliefs may support other, often rather
unnatural equilibria. Coate and Morris (1995) provide a discussion of the
issue in a related context as well as a simple monotonicity property for out-
of-equilibrium beliefs to support only ‘reasonable’ equilibria. For notational
convenience, define the sets Ci = {(n, pi + 3∆), (n, pi + 2∆), (o, pi +∆), (o, pi)}
and Di = Ci\{(o, pi)}, i = 1, 2. Ci is the set of all pairs (pi, vi) which, for some
draw of s and Si, contain as elements the superior policy and the corresponding
utility of the voter given a zero transfer.
Note that good incumbents’strategies are such that they always choose
the superior policy together with a zero transfer. For the sake of brevity, the
formal description of their behavior is suppressed in the following propositions.
Note also that the index for jurisdictions has been dropped for the remainder
of this subsection.
Before presenting Proposition 1, it is useful to state the following defini-
tions:
Definition 1 Define θ∗ ≡ (1 − q)/q, δ∗ = 1 − ∆/τ¯ and suppose q ≥ 1/2,
θ ≥ θ∗ and δ ≥ δ∗.
Note that with q ≥ 1/2 it is guaranteed that θ∗ ≤ 1.
6Under proposition 1, pairs (p, v) which do not occur on the equilibrium path will
necessarily reveal that either a transfer has been taken or the inferior policy has been
chosen, or both.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that, on the equilibrium path, beliefs are formed ac-
cording to Bayes’ rule and that off the equilibrium path beliefs are formed
as described above. With parameters as given in Definition 1, the following
strategies together with the specified beliefs constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium:
Bad incumbents choose the old policy in all cases. The transfer equals ∆ if
S = H and τ¯ if S = L. The representative voter reelects the incumbent if the
new policy is chosen and the voter’s utility is either pi+3∆ or pi+2∆, and if
the old policy is chosen and the voter’s utility is either pi+∆ or pi. In all other
cases, the incumbent is voted out of office and replaced by the challenger.
Formally, the strategies can be stated as follows:
Bad incumbents set
(i) µ(h,H,B) = µ(l, H,B) = (o,∆),
(ii) µ(h, L,B) = µ(l, L,B) = (o, τ¯),
and the representative voter sets
(iii) ς[(p, v) ∈ C] = 1,
(iv) ς[(p, v) /∈ C] = 0.
Proof. See the appendix to this chapter.
The intuition for this equilibrium is simple. Bad governments want to extract
the highest possible transfer in the first period, but at the same time they
seek reelection. With a sufficiently high discount factor, a mimicking behavior
in the case of S = H becomes worthwhile: The cost of a reduced transfer in
the first period is outweighed by the benefit of winning reelection and being
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able to extract the maximum transfer in the second period. Since using the
new policy is costly in terms of additional effort, bad governments prefer the
old policy in all cases. For the voter, reelecting governments pretending that
the old policy is superior and that payoffs are low is optimal as long as the
corresponding probabilities are sufficiently high.
2.3.2 The case of two jurisdictions: Yardstick competition
For the case with yardstick competition, denote the strategies of the incum-
bent in i by µ(s, Si, Ii; Ij) = (pi, τi) and the strategies of the voter in i by
ς(pi, vi; pj, vj) ∈ [0, 1], i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Before we can state the proposition
describing the yardstick competition equilibrium, it is necessary to carefully
specify the voters’ beliefs off the equilibrium path. First of all, let us transfer
the setting from the previous subsection and require that
(i) whenever, for some jurisdiction i, it is apparent that a transfer has been
taken and/or it is apparent that the inferior policy has been chosen, voters in
both jurisdictions believe that Ii = B.
In addition, we have to deal with the case that what the voter observes in
his own jurisdiction is consistent with the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy
while the behavior of the other jurisdiction’s incumbent is inconsistent with
his equilibrium strategy. How should the beliefs be specified in this case? First
of all note that with the strategies stated in the following proposition, for all
combinations (p1, v1), (p2, v2) off the equilibrium path, beliefs with respect to
the type of the incumbent in at least one jurisdiction are given by (i). This
being true, it is certainly the least restrictive way to complete the setting for
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs by requiring that
(ii) in cases where the belief with respect to the type of incumbent in their
own jurisdiction is not given by (i), voters form beliefs as if they performed
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a Bayesian updating based on the belief with regard to the type of the other
jurisdiction’s incumbent.
For notational convenience, define the set Ei = {(pi, vi) : pi = n, vi ∈
{pi+3∆, pi+2∆, pi+3∆− τ¯ , pi+∆, pi+2∆− τ¯}}, i = 1, 2. The crucial property
of Ei is that after observing some (pi, vi) ∈ Ei, voters in both jurisdictions
know that the new policy is superior.
Again it is useful to state some definitions before turning to the proposition:
Definition 2 Define δ∗∗ = 1 − ∆−e
τ¯
, σ∗∗ = 3q−1
2q
and γ∗∗ = 1−q(2−σ+θ(1−σ))
1−q(2−σ+θ(2−3σ)) ,
and suppose q > 1/2, θ ≥ θ∗, σ ≤ σ∗∗, γ ≥ γ∗∗ and δ ≥ δ∗∗.
Note that σ∗∗ ≥ q ∀ q ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
, such that for all such q there exists some
σ ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
for which q ≤ σ ≤ σ∗∗. Note furthermore that the denominator in
γ∗∗ is positive for all θ ∈ [θ∗, 1] given that q ∈ (1
2
, 1
]
and σ ∈ [q, σ∗∗], and that
γ∗∗ ≤ 1 ∀ σ ≥ 1/2.
Proposition 2 Suppose that, on the equilibrium path, beliefs are formed ac-
cording to Bayes’ rule and that off the equilibrium path beliefs are formed
as described above. With parameters as given in Definition 2, the following
strategies together with the specified beliefs constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium:
Bad incumbents choose the new policy only if the following three conditions
hold: The new policy is superior (s = h), the jurisdiction-specific shock is
positive (Si = H), and the other jurisdiction’s incumbent is good. In all other
cases, the old policy is chosen. The transfer equals τ¯ if Si = L and ∆ if
Si = H. The representative voter reelects the incumbent if the new policy is
chosen and the voter’s utility is either pi+3∆ or pi+2∆, and if the old policy
is chosen and the voter’s utility is either pi + ∆ or pi, provided that the out-
come in the other jurisdiction is not an element of E. In all other cases, the
incumbent is voted out of office and replaced by the challenger.
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Formally, the strategies can be stated as follows:
Bad incumbents set
(i) µ(h,H,B;B) = (o,∆),
(ii) µ(h,H,B;G) = (n,∆),
(iii) µ(h, L,B;B) = µ(h, L,B;G) = µ(l, L,B;B) = µ(l, L,B;G) = (o, τ¯),
(iv) µ(l, H,B;B) = µ(l, H,B;G) = (o,∆),
and the representative voters sets
(v) ς[(pi, vi) ∈ {(n, pi + 3∆), (n, pi + 2∆)}; ·] = 1,
(vi) ς[(pi, vi) ∈ {(o, pi +∆), (o, pi)}; (pj, vj) ∈ Ej] = 0,
(vii) ς[(pi, vi) ∈ {(o, pi +∆), (o, pi)}; (pj, vj) /∈ Ej] = 1,
(viii) ς[(pi, vi) /∈ Ci; ·] = 0.
Proof. See the appendix to this chapter.
The crucial point in comparison with the behavior of incumbents described
in Proposition 1 is part (ii) of bad incumbents’ strategy. By now being able
to compare policies in two jurisdictions, voters have additional information to
base their reelection decision on. If the new policy is superior, a bad incumbent
knowing that the government in the other jurisdiction is good is now forced to
choose the new policy to gain reelection: The choice of a good government in
the other jurisdiction will reveal that the new policy is superior, and running
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the old policy would therefore result in the government being removed from
office. The voter thus benefits from the additional information by getting the
superior policy more often. The selection properties, i.e. the probabilities of
finding out a bad incumbent, are the same in both equilibria.
The condition on the discount factor δ is stronger for the yardstick equilib-
rium than for the equilibrium without comparative performance evaluation.
The reason is that, if the other government is good and the new policy must
be used for a successful mimicking, the additional effort e has to be invested
to perform the public policy. Note, however, that the role of e is only to make
the new policy, other things being equal, less attractive for bad governments
than the old policy. Thus e might be arbitrarily small, and lime→0 δ∗∗ = δ∗. If
the new policy is superior, payoffs are high and the other government is bad,
or if the old policy is superior and payoffs are high, bad governments imitate
good governments in equilibrium by choosing (o,∆) and delivering v = pi.
Consequently, a sufficiently high γ is necessary to make reelection the optimal
choice for the voter after observing (o, pi) in both jurisdictions.
The most interesting parameter is σ. The yardstick equilibrium is sup-
ported by values of σ ∈ [q, σ∗∗], i.e. the positive correlation between S1 and
S2 must be sufficiently low. The intuition is that it must be worthwhile for
the voter to reelect an incumbent in a situation where (a) the same policy
has been chosen in both jurisdictions, (b) the voter’s utility in the other juris-
diction equals the maximum payoff for the policy chosen, and (c) the voter’s
own utility equals the maximum payoff for the policy chosen minus ∆. As a
counterexample, consider the case with perfect correlation [σ = 1] between S1
and S2 for some q ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. In this situation, it cannot be optimal for the voter
in i to reelect an incumbent choosing pi = n and delivering, say, vi = pi + 2∆
given that vj = pi + 3∆ since it is apparent that a transfer has been taken.
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2.4 Extension: Yardstick competition with common and
jurisdiction-specific policies
In the following, a straightforward extension of the theoretical analysis will be
presented. It covers asymmetric jurisdictions and a multi-dimensional policy
space.
Consider the model from section 2.2 with the extension that we now have
two tasks k = A,B. Suppose that A is a common task which has to be fulfilled
in both jurisdictions and let B be a task which is specific for jurisdiction
2 and which is not a policy task in jurisdiction 1. Clearly, with regard to
the specific task, yardstick competition between jurisdictions is impossible.
However, yardstick competition may takes place with respect to the common
task.
The government in i = 1 has to make the same choice as before. In i = 2
the government now has to choose two policies p2A and p2B. For each task,
the choice is between an old and a new policy. Assume that task-specific
state variables sk ∈ {l, h}, k = A,B are independently drawn from the same
distribution. θ is now the probability that sk = l is drawn for task k = A,B.
If sk = h [sk = l], the new [old] policy is superior for task k. As in the
model with a one-dimensional policy space, policy payoffs are either low or
high depending on the draw for Si ∈ {L,H}. Note that policy payoffs are
jurisdiction-specific, but not task-specific. Together with the policies p2A and
p2B, task-specific transfers τ2A, τ2B ∈ {0,∆, τ¯} must be chosen. The per-
period utility of the government in i = 2 from performance in task k now
is
u2k(p2k, τ2k) =
{
τ2k − e if p2k = n
τ2k if p2k = o .
In the situation without yardstick competition little is changed compared
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to subsection 2.3.1. In i = 1, proposition 1 holds. For i = 2, it is easy to show
that an equilibrium exists where
(i) bad governments choose (o,∆) for both tasks if S1 = H;
(ii) bad governments choose (o, τ¯) for both tasks if S1 = L;
(iii) the voter opts for the challenger if it is apparent that a transfer has been
taken or it is apparent that the inferior policy has been chosen for some task
k = A,B, or both, and reelects the incumbent otherwise.
For the situation with yardstick competition, let the strategies of incum-
bents in i = 1 be denoted by µ(sA, Si, Ii; Ij) = (p1A, τ1A), while strategies
of incumbents in i = 2 are denoted as µ(sA, sB, Si, Ii; Ij) = (µA, µB), where
µk = (sk, Si, Ii; Ij) = (p2k, τ2k), k = A,B. Assume out-of-equilibrium be-
liefs defined by analogy to the model with yardstick competition in a single
common policy.
Definition 3 Define σ˜ = 1/(1 + θ2), γ˜ = 1−q(2−σ+θ
2(1−σ))
1−q[2−σ+θ2(1−σ)+θ(1−σ(1+θ))] , θ˜ =
[1− q(2− σ)]/[q(1− σ)] and ˜˜θ = [(1− q)/(3q − 1)] 12 and suppose
(a) q ≥ 1/2,
(b) θ ≥ max{θ˜, ˜˜θ},
(c) σ˜ ≤ σ ≤ σ∗∗,
(d) δ ≥ δ∗∗,
(e) γ ≥ γ˜ if 1− q[2− σ + θ2(1− σ) + θ(1− σ(1 + θ))] > 0.
Before turning to the proposition, note that σ ≤ σ∗∗ implies θ˜ ≤ 1. Further-
more, θ ≥ ˜˜θ guarantees that for all q ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
there exists some σ such that
1/(1 + θ) ≤ σ ≤ σ∗∗ holds. With σ ≥ 1/(1 + θ) it is guaranteed that γ˜ ≤ 1.
In addition, with θ ≥ ˜˜θ we can be sure that for all q ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
there exists some
σ ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
such that σ˜ ≤ σ ≤ σ∗∗ holds.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that, on the equilibrium path, beliefs are formed ac-
cording to Bayes’ rule and that off the equilibrium path beliefs are formed
as described above. With parameters as given in Definition 3, the following
strategies together with the specified beliefs constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium:
Bad incumbents choose the old policy for the jurisdiction-specific task in all
cases. The new policy is chosen for the common task if the following three
conditions hold: The new policy is superior for the common task (sA = h),
the jurisdiction-specific shock is positive (S2 = H), and the other jurisdiction’s
incumbent is good. In all other cases, the old policy is chosen for the common
task. The transfer equals τ¯ (for all tasks) if Si = L and ∆ (for all tasks) if
Si = H. Voters in i = 1 (i = 2) vote for the challenger whenever (for some
task k = A,B) it is apparent that a transfer has been taken or if it is apparent
that the inferior policy has been chosen in i, or both. In all other cases, the
incumbent is reelected.
Formally, the strategies of bad incumbents can be stated as follows:
Bad incumbents in i = 1 follow their strategies described in proposition 2. Bad
incumbents in i = 2 set
(i) µk(h,H,B;B) = (o,∆), k = A,B
(ii) µA(h,H,B;G) = (n,∆),
µB(h,H,B;G) = (o,∆),
(iii) µk(l, H,B;B) = µk(l, H,B;G) = (o,∆), k = A,B
(iv) µk(h, L,B;B) = µk(h, L,B;G) =
µk(l, L,B;B) = µk(l, L,B;G) = (o, τ¯), k = A,B.
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Proof. See the appendix to this chapter.
From proposition 3 we see that the role of yardstick competition as a disci-
pline device for rent-seeking politicians carries over from the simple to a richer
model with various political tasks of governments and varying degrees of yard-
stick competition across tasks. However, in a model with only a subset of tasks
being subject to yardstick competition the pattern of government performance
becomes richer. Even benevolent governments now switch from innovative
to traditional policies across tasks. Moreover, rent-seeking governments can
stick to traditional policies and avoid innovations for jurisdiction-specific tasks
where comparative performance evaluation by voters is impossible. This gives
rent-seeking governments additional possibilities to masquerade as acting in
the interest of the voter. For common tasks the same discipline-enhancing
effect of comparative performance evaluations by voters is at work: if a new
policy is shown to be superior by successfully innovating good governments in
the neighborhood, bad governments seeking reelection are forced to use the
innovation, too.
2.5 Implications
The model presented above illustrates how yardstick competition between
governments of local jurisdictions can drive the diffusion of public sector inno-
vations among jurisdictions. Although the model is highly stylized, it captures
some crucial aspects of decentralized policy making and the adoption of inno-
vative policies. Most importantly, politicians are better informed about the
prospects of new policies than the citizens. At the same time, rent-seeking
politicians tend to avoid the additional effort needed to implement new poli-
cies. By comparing the performance of local governments across jurisdictions,
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citizens learn about political best-practice technologies, and office-motivated
governments are forced to implement successful new policies more often com-
pared to a situation without comparative performance evaluation across ju-
risdictions.
However, the increased probability for optimal policies being implemented
comes at a cost. In order to learn about political best-practice technologies,
citizens must collect and review information about the performance of several
local governments. Since the costs will increase with the number of jurisdic-
tions under monitoring, residents can be expected to use only a limited number
of reference jurisdictions as a yardstick for policies in their own jurisdiction.
Since the equilibrium with yardstick competition predicts local adoption de-
cisions to positively depend on expected adoptions in reference jurisdictions,
an empirical implication of the model is positive correlation in the adoption of
public sector innovations across jurisdictions belonging to the same reference
group.
The empirical implications of the extended model are the following: Firstly,
the share of tasks where innovative policies are used should on average be
higher with yardstick competition than without. Hence, governments should
implement innovative policies more often if policy competition is stronger.
Secondly, the share of tasks where governments use innovative policies should
show spatial correlation. Finally, the model suggests that the degree of spatial
correlation in policy innovations varies across policies with the intensity of
policy competition.
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Appendix to Chapter 2: Proofs of propositions
Proof of proposition 1:
We begin by checking for profitable deviations of the voter. Since good incum-
bents maximize the voter’s utility and bad incumbents according to the pro-
posed strategy never play in a way such that (p, v) ∈ D, reelecting the incum-
bent after observing (p, v) ∈ D and not reelecting after observing (p, v) /∈ C
is optimal for the voter. Let Pr(I = G|p, v) denote the voter’s beliefs. Af-
ter observing (o, pi), the probability of a good government holding office is
Pr(I = G|o, pi) = γθq
γθq+(1−γ)(1−q) . This is at least as high as γ, the probability
of drawing a good challenger, if θ ≥ θ∗.
Now we have to check for profitable deviations of bad incumbents. For a
bad incumbent experiencing S = L playing (o, τ¯) dominates any other action:
Reelection can only be gained by taking a zero transfer in the first period,
which cannot be optimal given that the utility from taking the maximum
transfer in the second period is δτ¯ . Since choosing the new policy is costly, it
can also not be optimal to play p = n and take some transfer τ ∈ {0,∆, τ¯}.
If S = H, a bad government receives utility ∆+ δτ¯ by following the proposed
strategy. As before, playing p = n instead cannot be optimal since e > 0.
Finally, given that δ ≥ δ∗, a deviation to (o, τ¯) is not profitable.
Proof of proposition 2:
Once again we begin by checking for profitable deviations of the voter. Let
Pr(Ii = G|pi, vi; pj, vj) denote beliefs of voters. As before, if the voter observes
(n, pi+3∆) in his own jurisdiction, he believes a good incumbent to hold office
with probability one. For (pi, vi) = (n, pi+2∆), we have to consider three cases.
Firstly, Pr(Ii = G|n, pi + 2∆;n, pi + 3∆) = γq(1−σ)γq(1−σ)+(1−γ)(1−q(2−σ)) . This is at
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least as high as γ since σ ≤ σ∗∗. Secondly, Pr(Ii = G|n, pi + 2∆;n, pi + 2∆) =
γσ+(1−γ)(1−σ)
γσ+2(1−γ)(1−σ) , which is at least as high as γ given that σ ≥ 1/2. Thirdly,
after observing (n, pi+2∆; (pj, vj) /∈ {(n, pi+3∆), (n, pi+2∆)}), reelecting the
incumbent is optimal since by applying Bayes’ Rule and – if necessary – the
out-of-equilibrium beliefs, in all cases we find that the probability of a good
incumbent holding office is one.
Part (vi) of the voter’s strategy reflects out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Since
the observation of each of the elements in Ej reveals that the new policy is
superior, it is optimal not to reelect a government in i 6= j choosing pi = o.
With regard to part (vii) of the voters strategy, first note that bad govern-
ments according to the proposed strategies never play (o, pi +∆). As long as
(pj, vj) /∈ Ej, it is therefore optimal to reelect the incumbent in i 6= j after ob-
serving (pi, vi) = (o, pi+∆). Furthermore, note that Pr(Ii = G|o, pi; o, pi+∆) =
Pr(Ii = G|n, pi + 2∆;n, pi + 3∆). Thus it is optimal to reelect the incumbent
in i after observing (o, pi; o, pi + ∆) given that σ ≤ σ∗∗. If voters observe
(o, pi) in both jurisdictions, the probability of a good government holding of-
fice is γ
2θqσ+γ(1−γ)θq(1−σ)
γ2θqσ+2γ(1−γ)θq(1−σ)+(1−γ)2(1−q(2−σ)) . This is at least as high as γ given
that γ ≥ γ∗∗. If (o, pi; o, pi − τ¯) is observed, the probability for the voter in
i of having a good government is γθσ
γθσ+(1−γ)(1−σ) . This is at least as high as
γ for all θ ∈ [θ∗, 1] given that σ ≥ q. Finally, applying Bayes’ Rule together
with the out-of-equilibrium beliefs specified above shows that for all remaining
(pj, vj) /∈ Ej it is optimal to reelect the incumbent after observing (o, pi) in i.
Part (viii) of the voters strategy is optimal since by observing (pi, vi) /∈ Ci
it is revealed that either a transfer has been taken or the inferior policy has
been chosen in i, or both.
Now we check for profitable deviations of bad incumbents. Given that bad
governments facing a bad government in the neighboring jurisdiction never
implement the new policy, yardstick competition does not provide the voter
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with additional information in this case compared to the situation with only a
single jurisdiction, and policy choices and transfers identical to those described
in proposition 1 together with the specified beliefs and the proposed voting rule
constitute an equilibrium in the presence of yardstick competition. If the other
government is good, however, it is not longer optimal for a bad incumbent in
i to choose (o,∆) if s = h and Si = H since the superior new policy will
be used in j, leading the voter in i to vote for the challenger. Instead, it is
now optimal for i’s incumbent to set (n,∆), to deliver vi = pi + 2∆ to the
voter and gain reelection: Since δ ≥ δ∗∗, the utility ∆ − e + δτ¯ is at least
as high as the one from the best alternative, (o, τ¯). If s = l and Si = H,
(o,∆) remains the optimal choice since given the proposed voting rule the
probability of reelection is one. If Si = L and the other government is good,
the same reasoning as in the proof of proposition 1 applies.
Proof of proposition 3:
I will be brief since the proof is similar to the one for proposition 2. We start
with the voter in i = 2. Let Pr[I2 = G|(p2A, v2A), (p2B, v2B); (p1A, v1A)] denote
his beliefs. Consider the following five cases on the equilibrium path:
(I) Pr[I2 = G|(n, pi+2∆), (o, pi); (n, pi+3∆)] = γθq(1−σ)γθq(1−σ)+(1−γ)(1−q(2−σ)) . This is
at least as high as γ given that θ ≥ θ˜.
(II) Pr[I2 = G|(n, pi + 2∆), (o, pi); (n, pi + 2∆)] = γθσ+(1−γ)θ(1−σ)γθσ+(1−γ)(1+θ)(1−σ) . This is at
least as high as γ given that θ ≥ γ(1−σ)
γσ+(1−γ)(1−σ) , which is implied by θ ≥ θ˜.
(III) Pr[I2 = G|(o, pi), (o, pi); (o, pi +∆)] = γθq(1−σ)γθq(1−σ)+(1−γ)(1−q(2−σ)) . See (I).
(IV) Pr[I2 = G|(o, pi), (o, pi); (o, pi)] = γ2θ2qσ+γ(1−γ)θ2q(1−σ)γ2θ2qσ+γ(1−γ)θ(1+θ)q(1−σ)+(1−γ)2(1−q(2−σ)) .
This is at least as high as γ if the denominator in γ˜ is smaller than or equal to
zero given that σ ≥ 1/(1 + θ), which is implied by σ ≥ σ˜. If the denominator
in γ˜ is strictly positive we have Pr[I2 = G|(o, pi), (o, pi); (o, pi)] ≥ γ since γ ≥ γ˜.
(V) Pr[I2 = G|(o, pi), (o, pi); (o, pi − τ¯)] = γθ2σγθ2σ+(1−γ)(1−σ) . This is at least as
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high as γ given that σ ≥ σ˜.
In all remaining cases the optimality of the voting rule is immediately obvious
from Bayes’ Rule or given by the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. By repeating the
same procedure for the voter in i = 1 it is easy to show that the proposed
voting rule is optimal given that the conditions specified above hold.
For the incumbent in i = 1 the situation is basically unchanged compared to
the situation with an identical neighborhood jurisdiction. He must be willing
to invest e in order to gain reelection. Since δ ≥ δ∗∗ this is the case. The
incumbent in i = 2 must prefer the new policy for task A if sA = h, S2 = H
and I1 = G. This requires δ ≥ 1− (∆− 12e)/τ˜ , which is implied by δ ≥ δ∗∗.

Chapter 3
Spatial effects in limited dependent variable
models
3.1 Introduction
Compared to the vast theoretical and applied literature on spatial effects in
linear models,1 the number of contributions on limited dependent variable
models with spatial effects is rather limited.2 One reason is that the esti-
mation of the standard model, an autoregressive spatial probit, is computa-
tionally involved. Standard econometric software packages do not allow to
estimate the spatial probit, and constructing own procedures requires consid-
erable programming effort. Secondly, estimation of the spatial probit relies on
maximum likelihood (ML) techniques, whereas the literature on linear spatial
models shows a distinct preference for instrumental variables (IV) and general
method of moments (GMM) approaches. Both IV and GMM methods have
1Anselin (1988) and the volumes “New directions in spatial econometrics”, edited by L.
Anselin and R.J.G.M. Florax in 1995 and “Advances in spatial econometrics, edited by L.
Anselin, R.J.G.M. Florax and S.J. Rey in 2004 may serve as introductory texts.
2See Beron and Vijverberg (2004), Pinkse, Shen, and Slade (2003), Hautsch and Klotz
(2003), LeSage (2000), Pinkse and Slade (1998), Dubin (1995), McMillen (1995, 1992), and
Case (1992).
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certain advantages compared to ML, in particular in terms of the robustness
of parameter estimates with regard to spatial error dependence.
However, processes with discrete outcomes are an important real world
phenomenon, and it is crucial to develop and improve on existing analytical
techniques suitable for analyzing spatial effects in processes involving discrete
choice. In particular, the analysis of spatial effects in public policies with
discrete outcomes requires appropriate empirical techniques. In the following,
a short introduction to various empirical approaches is given. However, the
discussion is not meant to be exhaustive. In particular, the chapter does not
cover Bayesian approaches to the estimation of limited dependent variable
models. The interested reader is referred to LeSage (2000). Rather, the pur-
pose of the chapter is to give the reader an overview of the empirical models
which are used in Chapters 4 to 6.
3.2 The spatial linear probability model
The spatial linear probability model (LPM) is certainly the simplest frame-
work that can be used to estimate a spatial limited dependent variable model.
The structural equation is
yi = φy−i + xiβ + ui, (3.1)
where yi are outcomes, y−i is the outcome of a composite neighbor of i, xi is
a K +1 row vector of control variables where the first element is unity, φ and
β are (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated, and ui is an error term. It is
standard in applications incorporating spatial effects to write the outcome of
the composite neighbor as a linear combination,
y−i =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij yj, (3.2)
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where the w’s are weights defined according to some metric of neighborliness
among the units of observation such that
∑
j 6=iwij = 1. The normalization
of the sum of weights is usually done in spatial models to ensure that the
potential overall impact of the composite neighbor is the same for all units
of observation. Without this normalization, it would in most applications be
difficult to give a clear interpretation to the coefficient φ.
The limitations of the model are obvious.3 Nevertheless, as a simple check
for results derived from more elaborate models, the LPM is a very useful tool
that should not be dismissed.
Since the LPM is a linear model, the standard approaches to deal with the
problems of endogeneity of y−i and spatial correlation in the errors ui can be
used in estimation.4 For instance, one can apply 2SLS, where instruments are
derived as described in Section 3.5.
3.3 The spatial autoregressive model
Consider a limited dependent variable model where a latent variable y∗i deter-
mines actual outcomes yi according to
yi = 1[y
∗
i > 0], i = 1, . . . , N, (3.3)
where 1[·] is the indicator function. A structural spatial auto-regressive (SAR)
model for the latent variable is specified as
y∗i = φ y
∗
−i + xiβ + ui, (3.4)
where y∗−i is the latent variable of a composite neighbor of i, xi is again a
K + 1 row vector of control variables with the first element being unity, and
3See Wooldridge (2002), p. 454-57 for an extensive discussion of the LPM.
4These are discussed in more detail in the following sections.
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ui is an i.i.d. error distributed symmetrically about zero with variance σ
2. To
guarantee stability assume that |φ| < 1. In this model, a positive φ would
mean that the latent variables are positively interdependent.
A general discussion of the autoregressive model is given in McMillen
(1992) and Beron and Vijverberg (2004). As mentioned above, the usual way
of parameter estimation based on Eq. (3.3) and Eq. (3.4) is to run a spatial
probit on a reduced form of the latent variable equation using ML methods.
The reduced form can be written in matrix form as
y∗ = (I − φW )−1(Xβ + u), (3.5)
where W is the N -dimensional square matrix of weights. In general, the ML
approach to this estimation problem is computationally involved and diffi-
cult to handle. There are two main problems with ML estimation based on
Eq. (3.5): Firstly, the spatial structure of the model induces heteroskedasticity
and therefore causes inconsistency of the parameter estimates. Secondly, the
spatially correlated covariance structure does not allow to simplify the mul-
tivariate distribution to a product of univariate distributions. Consequently,
ML estimation involves an N -dimensional integration problem.
A useful simplification of the model has been proposed by Case (1992).
Her approach accounts for the heteroskedastic error structure, but neglects
the presence of non-zero elements in the variance-covariance matrix. In its
original formulation, Case’s model requires W to be a block-diagonal matrix
of weights. This is equivalent to a metric of neighborliness where the units of
observation are divided into groups. All units of observation belonging to the
same group are defined as ‘neighbors’ to each other. Suppose that i belongs to
groupm(i) and that nm(i) is the number of units in that group. The composite
neighbor’s latent variable is then given as the average of the latent variables
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of units belonging to the same group as i,
y∗−i =
1
nm(i) − 1
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
dij y
∗
j , (3.6)
where dij is an indicator taking value 1 if m(j) = m(i) and zero otherwise. As
Case (1992) has shown, with the resulting block-diagonal weight matrix the
individual equations of the reduced form can be rewritten as
y∗i = %m(i)xiβ + nm(i)ϑm(i)x¯m(i)β + %m(i)ui + nm(i)ϑm(i)u¯m(i), (3.7)
where x¯m(i) is the vector of mean characteristics for districts in m(i), u¯m(i) is
the mean of errors in m(i), %m(i) = (nm(i) − 1)/(φ + nm(i) − 1), and ϑm(i) =
φ/[(1 − φ)(φ + nm(i) − 1)]. Denote the error of the reduced form as vi such
that
vi = %m(i)ui + nm(i)ϑm(i)u¯m(i). (3.8)
The variance covariance matrix of the system is
Ω = E(vv′) = (I − φW )−1(I − φW )−1′σ2. (3.9)
Eq. (3.9) reveals that v is heteroskedastic by construction. A variance normal-
izing transformation to restore homoskedasticity is to pre-multiply the system
by the inverse of the square root of diag(Ω). It is straightforward to show that
the transformation matrix D is a diagonal matrix, with the ith element on the
main diagonal given as
D(i, i) = [(%m(i) + ϑm(i))
2 + (nm(i) − 1)ϑ2m(i)]−
1
2 . (3.10)
Based on the transformed system, the parameters can be estimated by stan-
dard ML methods.
As in any model aiming at the identification of spatial dependence, a par-
ticular problem is to separate spatial correlation in the variables of interest
from spatial error correlation. To account for the potential presence of spatial
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correlation in u, the model can be extended to incorporate shocks driven by
a spatial autoregressive process such as
u = ρWu+ ², (3.11)
where it is assumed that |ρ| < 1 and that ² is an i.i.d. error. In matrix
notation, the composite error of the reduced form is then given by
v = (I − φW )−1(I − ρW )−1². (3.12)
The variance normalizing transformation is constructed along the same lines
as described before. The elements of the transformation matrix are functions
of φ and ρ, and the estimation can again rely on standard ML methods.
It has been questioned in the literature whether φ and ρ can be separately
identified given that they play very similar roles in the extended model.5 To
avoid this identification problem, a spatial moving average instead of the spa-
tial autoregressive process can be used to model spatial error dependence:
u = ρW²+ ² = (I + ρW )². (3.13)
The difference between Eq. (3.11) and Eq. (3.13) becomes clear once the au-
toregressive process is iterated. After M iterations, it can be written as
u = (I + ρW + ρ2W 2 + · · · )²+ (ρW )M+1u. (3.14)
Eq. (3.14) illustrates that with a general weight matrix, in contrast to the
spatial moving average process, the autoregressive process links the error of
any given unit of observation to the errors of all other units of observation in
the system. Note, however, that with the particular weight matrix proposed
by Case (1992), the autoregressive and the moving average error process are
again very similar. The reason is that with weights defining groups of neigh-
bors without any relation between units belonging to different groups, weights
5See, for instance, Anselin and Florax (1995).
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matrices of higher order are again block diagonal matrices such as W . A use-
ful way to facilitate the identification of φ and ρ in Case’ model is to use a
weight matrix different fromW when modelling spatial error dependence. For
instance, the spatial error process could be written as
u = ρW2²+ ², (3.15)
where the elements ofW2 are defined by some metric of neighborliness different
from the one underlying W . Since W2 will in general not be a block-diagonal
matrix, it is slightly more complicated to derive the estimation equation. Using
a reasonable approximation for (I − φW )−1u, the error of the reduced form
can be written as
v = (I + φW + φ2W 2 + φ3W 3)(I + ρW2)². (3.16)
Starting from Eq. (3.16), the variance normalizing transformation can be de-
rived for general weight matrices W and W2.
An advantage of the spatial autoregressive model compared to the models
discussed in sections 3.4 to 3.2 is that it can be applied in situations with
incomplete information on y. For instance, if y is observed only for a subset
of all units of observation, nothing precludes the estimation of φ based on
the available information. The reason is simple: Specifying the right hand
side of the reduced form requires information only on a unit of observation’s
own and neighbors’ characteristics. Knowledge on neighbors’ outcomes is
not required. In many applications, information on the characteristics x are
readily available for all units of observation. The spatial autoregressive model
can then be applied even if information on y is available only for a sample of
all units in the population.
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3.4 Spatial effects with time lags
Irrespective of the fact that the function which determines the index y∗i (usu-
ally called the index function) is commonly taken to be linear in the param-
eters, discrete choice models such as logit or probit are nonlinear models by
definition. This is because the index is unobservable and the likelihood func-
tion is determined by making use of a distributional assumption on the errors.
It should have become clear by now that, compared to linear models, the iden-
tification of spatial dependence in discrete choice models is complicated by a
number of issues. Of course, the question arises how consistent estimation of
spatial effects in probit and logit models can be achieved more easily. One
way to circumvent some of the problems mentioned so far is to condition on
neighbors’ observed outcomes in previous periods instead of neighbors’ con-
temporaneous latent variables. A linear specification for the latent variable
with a one-period time lag can be written as
y∗it = φy−i, t−1 + xitβ + uit, (3.17)
where y−i, t−1 is now a linear combination of neighbors’ lagged outcomes of a
form analogous to the one displayed in Eq. (3.2).
In some applications, it may be necessary to include yi, t−1 among the
characteristics xit to account for inertia in the process driving y. If yi, t−1 is
included, the conditional probability for the outcome yit = 1 is
Pr
(
yit = 1 | {yj, t−1}Nj=1, xit
)
= Pr
(
y∗it > 0 | {yj, t−1}Nj=1, xit
)
. (3.18)
With an appropriate assumption on the distribution of u, the composite pa-
rameters φ/σ and β/σ are identified and average partial effects can be esti-
mated using standard ML techniques.
A number of issues must be addressed with respect to the model displayed
in Eq. (3.18). First of all, the question arises why the interaction among the
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units of observation should take the specific form assumed here. In general,
the assumption that the interaction involves a time lag may be more or less
reasonable, depending on the particular application. For instance, when y
describes the outcome of a complex political process, the notion that the
reaction to other decision makers’ choices is lagged by one period may often
be quite realistic.
Obviously, the model with neighbors’ lagged decisions appearing on the
right hand side avoids the simultaneity issue that requires the construction of
a reduced form in the case of the spatial autoregressive model.6 However, with
serial correlation in errors, yi, t−1 may be correlated with u, causing inconsis-
tency of the parameter estimates. Consequently, if Eq. (3.18) has yi, t−1 as a
right hand side variable, it is crucial to assume that u is serially uncorrelated.
Unfortunately, the absence of serial correlation cannot be tested in cases where
only a single cross-section of observations is available. Instrumenting the po-
tentially endogenous lagged decision would allow to circumvent the problem.
However, apart from the fact that the standard approach of instrumenting
in a limited dependent variable framework does not cover the case of a bi-
nary endogenous explanatory variable, it is extremely difficult to find valid
instruments for a lagged dependent variable.
It is also worth noting that the model with neighbors’ lagged decisions does
not put any restriction on the size of the interaction coefficient. However, as
mentioned above, in most probit or logit models the parameter estimates and
the estimate for the variance of the error are not separately identified anyway.
Case (1992) discusses the issue in a related context.
When spatial effects are modelled to occur with time lags, it is difficult to
properly account for the potential presence of spatial error correlation. Some-
6Studies with continuous dependent variables relying on time lags to identify spatial
interactions include Hayashi and Boadway (2000) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002).
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times it is reasonable to include a full series of dummy variables for certain
regions, i.e. subgroups of the units of observation, to alleviate the problem of
correlated shocks affecting the outcomes. In any case, one should test how
the inclusion of region-specific dummy variables affects the correlation among
residuals in a model without interaction among the units of observation. This
can be done by running a test for the presence of spatial error correlation in a
baseline model and a model including region-specific dummy variables. Sup-
pose that the residuals follow a spatial auto-regressive process as in Eq. (3.11).
Since y∗it is a latent variable, the ordinary residuals, uˆit = y
∗
it − xitβˆ, are not
observed. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis of spatial independence (ρ = 0)
can be tested based on generalized residuals using the Lagrange-multiplier
(LM) test for probit models proposed by Pinkse and Slade (1998).
3.5 Conditioning on neighbors’ contemporaneous out-
comes: The instrumental variables probit
Both the autoregressive model and the model with time-lagged spatial effects
have attractive features. The instrumental variables probit (IV probit) com-
bines two of them, one from each model. Firstly, from the spatial autoregres-
sive model the feature of contemporaneous interaction is adopted. Secondly,
as in the model with time-lagged spatial effects, the model has a linear com-
bination of neighbors’ outcomes instead of neighbors’ latent variables on the
right hand side of the structural equation, which is written as
y∗i = φy−i + xiβ + ui. (3.19)
Again, y−i is a linear combination of neighbors’ outcomes of the usual form.
Note that the y’s on the right hand side of Eq. (3.19) are functions of y∗i
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through their dependence on yi:
yl = 1[φ
N∑
j=1
j 6=l
wljyj + xlβ + ul > 0]
= 1[φ(wl1y1 + · · ·wliyi + · · ·wlNyN) + xlβ + ul > 0]. (3.20)
When estimating φ and β, the endogeneity of y−i has to be taken into account.7
Several approaches to deal with the endogeneity of explanatory variables in
discrete choice models have been proposed. They all make use of a reduced
form equation for the endogenous regressor y−i,
y−i = xiδ1 + ziδ2 + νi. (3.21)
Here, zi are instruments for y−i. The most straightforward estimation ap-
proach is to use conditional maximum likelihood (CML) as discussed in
Wooldridge (2002), p. 475-77. It allows estimation of φ and β in a simple
one-stage procedure. The approach is straightforward to implement and can
be used to calculate average partial effects. Other approaches rely on two-step
procedures. Newey (1987) has proposed a particularly useful two-step proce-
dure which is similar in spirit to the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach
for linear models with endogenous regressors.8 A natural choice for the in-
struments is to use spatially transformed values of the exogenous explanatory
variables. That is, the N -dimensional square matrix W is multiplied with
the N -dimensional vectors of characteristics, Xk, to produce vectors of instru-
ments, Zk = WXk.
9 Of course, as with all instrumental variables approaches,
7Beron and Vijverberg (2004) claim that a model with y−i on the right hand side
is infeasible. However, if y−i is properly treated as an endogenous explanatory variable,
nothing precludes estimation of the parameters.
8See Rivers and Vuong (1988) for an alternative two-step approach for probit models
with endogenous explanatory variables.
9Note that characteristics with missing values for some units of observation cannot be
used to construct instruments.
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the identification of the parameters critically depends on the quality of the
instruments: The instruments must be partially correlated with y−i once the
other exogenous variables have been netted out, and they must be uncorre-
lated with u, i.e. z must be exogenous in Eq. (3.21).
Apart from the assumptions with regard to the instruments, both the CML
and the two-step approach of Newey rely on fairly strong assumptions. In par-
ticular, ui and νi are assumed to be jointly normal. Hence, y−i given (xi, zi)
should also be normally distributed. Irrespective of how y−i is scaled, the
values this variable can take will always be bounded below by zero and above
by some positive number. Therefore, the assumption of joint normality of ui
and νi may not be perfectly met. To check the robustness of the results, it is
often useful to estimate a spatial linear probability model by 2SLS where no
distributional assumption with regard to the errors is needed. In addition, the
LPM offers a simple way to check the results for robustness with respect to
spatial error dependence. As Kelejian and Prucha (1998) have shown for the
standard case of a continuous dependent variable, instrumental variables esti-
mation generates consistent estimates of the coefficients even in the presence
of spatial error dependence.
Chapter 4
School choice in Michigan: Competition as a
driving force for public sector innovation
4.1 Introduction
An ongoing debate revolves around the effects of competition on public school
performance. Given that public schools cannot engage in price competition,
the question which is typically asked is how a marginal increase in the degree
of competition affects the academic achievement of students and the efficiency
of public schooling. This is justified by the fact that student achievement
and the efficiency of service provision are the key variables students, parents
and taxpayers are interested in. However, looking at the correlation between
output variables and competition measures does not reveal much about how
the public school sector is reacting to the forces of competition. Consider
an example with metropolitan areas, some of which have stronger competi-
tion among public schools in the sense that they are divided into more school
districts.1 With more school districts, it is easier for households to sort them-
selves according to preferences for public schooling, property and amenities.
In general, to the extent that stronger sorting will increase the match qual-
1This is how Hoxby (1994) measures competition among public schools.
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ity between students and schools, competition will benefit average student
achievement. Hence, even if the behavior of public schools and school districts
as schooling producers given their student body is unaffected by the degree of
competition, stronger competition may nevertheless lead to better outcomes.
For thinking about and assessing reforms towards increased parental choice,
a better understanding of the channels through which competition affects the
relevant outcomes of public schooling is crucial. Most importantly, we need
more insight into the behavior of public schools facing increased competition
from other public and private schools.
This chapter examines the effect of increased competition in the public
school sector on the behavior of local school districts. In particular, I ask
whether public schools really compete for students and resources. For an-
swering this question, I make use of a significant change in the institutional
environment of the public school sector in Michigan in 1996, when a vol-
untary inter-district choice program was established. Under this program,
students were given the right to enroll at public schools outside their district
of residence. Local school districts would not be forced to accept non-resident
students, but districts participating in the choice program and allowing for the
enrollment of transfer students would receive additional state funds depending
on the number of non-resident students enrolled. The analysis focusses on the
districts’ participation decisions in the second year of the program. It exploits
the variation in the degree of competition for non-resident students which
resulted from the initial participation decisions of all districts, and asks how
competition affected the districts’ readiness to experiment with the new policy.
The results suggest that the school districts did use participation in the inter-
district choice program to actively engage in competition for students and
resources. Facing increased risk of losing students and resources, the school
districts seem to have flexibly reacted to competition from neighboring dis-
tricts. They did this by ’striking back’, i.e. they were more likely to compete
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for non-resident students if neighboring districts did so. The results also sug-
gest that the impact of neighbors’ decisions on the participation probability
was substantial, and that competition for students contributed significantly
to the share of districts allowing for inter-district transfers increasing from 37
percent in 1996/97 to more than 70 percent in 2002/03.
The analysis presented in this chapter adds to the existing literature in
explicitly addressing the reactions of schooling producers to increased com-
petition. There is only a limited number of studies that have done so be-
fore. Vedder and Hall (2000) and Hoxby (1994) find evidence that public
schools react to greater competition from private schools by paying higher
teacher salaries. Evidence suggesting that competition enhances the work ef-
fort of teachers is presented by Rapp (2000). Finally, Hoxby (2000) shows
that increased competition among public schools reduces per-pupil spending
and makes school districts allocate resources away from other inputs towards
reducing the student-teacher ratio.
In contrast to the limited number of papers on the effects of competition
on schooling producers’ behavior and policies, an extensive literature has ad-
dressed the effects of competition on the performance of public schools and
on student achievement. While the theoretical predictions are unclear,2 the
empirical findings suggest that the overall effects of competition are posi-
tive.3 Hoxby (2000, 2003) shows that competition working through residential
choices as well as competition provided by recent choice reforms such as vouch-
ers and charter schools positively affects student achievement and school pro-
2Hoxby (1999), for instance, offers a principal-agent model of the productivity of school-
ing producers, showing that a system with property tax finance and Tiebout choice among
many jurisdictions reduces rent taken by producers. Epple and Romano (1998) show that
low-ability students may be adversely affected by school choice due to peer-group effects.
3See Belfield and Levin (2002) for a literature survey. The authors report on a large
number of contributions, with a sizable majority showing beneficial effects of competition.
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ductivity. Sandstro¨m and Bergstro¨m (2005) find that school results in Swedish
public schools have improved due to competition from independent schools.
Couch and Shugart II (1993) find competition by private schools to positively
affect public school performance.4 Dee (1998) and Hoxby (1994) also address
the question whether the achievement of students in public schools is im-
proved when the proportion of students attending private schools is higher.
Both studies conclude that the competition from private schools has a signifi-
cant positive effect on the quality of public schools. Grosskopf, Hayes, Taylor,
and Weber (2001) find that stronger competition in terms of a lower mar-
ket share of the biggest schooling producers reduces allocative inefficiencies in
some communities.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, the Michigan inter-
district school choice program and potential factors affecting policy preferences
of districts are described. Section 4.3 deals with the estimation approach, and
the data and the estimation results are presented in Section 4.4.
4.2 Inter-district school choice in Michigan
Inter-district school choice allows students to attend a public school in a school
district other than the district of residence. In the US, some states have en-
acted mandatory choice laws. In these states, school districts are, under cer-
tain conditions, obliged to enroll non-resident students at local public schools.
In contrast to this, participation of school districts in Michigan and several
other states is voluntary. While school districts cannot prevent resident stu-
dents from choosing a school outside the district, they can prevent the transfer
of non-resident students to local schools. For each school year, a school district
4The robustness of the results of Couch and Shugart II (1993) has been questioned by
Newmark (1995).
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in Michigan has to determine whether or not it will accept applications for
enrollment by non-resident students. That is, the districts’ decisions whether
or not to participate in the program are not made once-and-for-all, but can be
adjusted for each commencing school year. Moreover, the number of positions
available may be specified. Michigan’s inter-district public school choice pro-
gram has been launched by a state law enacted in 1996.5 Under the new law,
districts were free to enroll any applicant in the district’s schools provided that
the student’s home district belongs to the same regional educational service
agency. In Michigan, regional educational service agencies are called Interme-
diate School Districts (ISDs). ISDs originally were created to provide local
school districts with services and programs too expensive or too extensive to
be offered by districts individually. In 1997, Michigan had 554 school districts
and 57 ISDs.
It is important to notice that in its school finance scheme Michigan had
shifted from a system relying primarily on local property taxes to a scheme
with a per-student state guarantee financed essentially by an increase in the
state’s sale taxes rate in 1994. The reform markedly increased the degree of
centralization in Michigan’s school finance scheme. In 1992/93, local revenues
on average contributed 65 cents to each dollar of total revenues, while 31 cents
came from state funds. By 1997/98, the share of local revenues had dropped
to 28 percent and the proportion of state revenues had soared to 68 percent.
The minimum school foundation allowance going from the state to local school
districts was $ 4,200 per student for the school year 1994/95 and had increased
to $ 5,124 per student for the school year 1997/98.6 Districts losing students
under the school choice regime would thus immediately suffer a significant
decrease in revenues. At the same time, the school choice program offered
5For details see Michigan Compiled Laws, Section 388.1705 (Act 300, 1996).
6For details on the school finance reform in Michigan, see Michigan Department of
Treasury (2002).
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districts the chance to attract students from elsewhere and thereby to raise
their revenues.
School districts attracting students from other districts do not only re-
ceive additional state funds, but also face an increase in costs. In general,
districts will consider to enroll non-resident students only if per-student state
aid is at least as high as the costs to serve an additional student. For many
school districts, this condition will not hold. This, however, does not pre-
clude that there are strong incentives for many school districts to make use
of inter-district school choice. Suppose, for instance, that the districts have
perfectly adjusted their capacity to the number of resident students, but that
some districts, given their physical capital such as school buildings and the
number of teachers employed, operate somewhat below their capacity limit
in terms of student enrollment. For these school districts, luring non-resident
students to local schools makes good sense, since the cost of serving some
additional students will be modest. The competition for students and state
funds is a zero-sum game, so if some districts stand to gain students and
funds, others stand to lose. Since adjusting capacity is costly or, for small
changes in enrollment, even impossible, districts that lose students now face
incentives to participate in inter-district choice in order to fully exploit their
capacity. Again, other districts will be affected, and so forth. The bottom
line is that even if the initial situation is one with only a minority of dis-
tricts benefitting from inter-district transfers, student mobility across district
borders will ultimately provide many districts with incentives to compete for
non-resident students. It should be noted, however, that the fiscal incentive
to attract or retain students is mitigated by the capitalization effects of inter-
district school choice and the corresponding effect on property tax revenues.
As Reback (2005) has shown for inter-district choice in Minnesota, residen-
tial property values appreciate in districts where students are able to transfer
to preferred schools outside the district and decline in districts that accept
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transfer students.
The school districts’ attitude toward school choice might also be affected
by factors other than capacity and revenues. In the following, the variables
included as controls in the empirical specifications are briefly discussed. First
of all, the districts’ preferences may vary with size. Bigger districts are more
closed, so open enrollment may be a less relevant policy for them. Smaller dis-
trict may also show a stronger tendency to welcome transfer students due to
economies of scale, and they may be more flexible in adjusting to the opportu-
nities provided by the new state law. Another important factor influencing the
propensity to participate in open enrollment might be the quality of local pub-
lic schools in terms of educational achievement. Districts with better schools
are more likely to be able to attract non-resident students and should therefore
be more inclined towards school choice than districts with worse schools. On
the other hand, districts with worse schools will see more students leaving, and
the incentives to compensate for the loss in revenues may be stronger. With
regard to some characteristics, a district’s position relative to its immediate
neighbors may be relevant. The point is that, due to transportation to more
distant schools being either unavailable or prohibitively costly, school districts
will be able to attract students only from nearby districts. A district’s relative
attractiveness for potential transfer students and the average characteristics
of non-resident students whose application is anticipated will therefore de-
pend on a district’s characteristics relative to its neighbors. To capture this,
I construct two additional control variables. The first one describes a dis-
trict’s relative position with respect to the share of minority students. This
variable is conveniently defined as the difference between the district’s own
share of minority students and the mean of this share for all contiguous dis-
tricts within the ISD,7 weighted by district population. The relative position
7Recall that participating districts did only accept applications from students residing
within the same ISD.
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with regard to the districts’ median housing value is constructed in the same
way. This variable is meant to capture the potential capitalization effects of
inter-district school choice. Districts with property values well above those
of neighboring districts may be particularly hesitant to participate given the
potential of inter-district choice to diminish property value differentials which
reflect differences in school quality.
Based on the preceding discussion, I include as control variables in the em-
pirical specification enrollment as a measure for the districts’ size; the student-
teacher ratio, measuring the capacity for enrollment of transfer students; total
revenues per student as a measure for fiscal stress; the average percentage of 7th
graders performing satisfactorily in reading and math; the difference between
own and neighbors’ share of minority students; and the difference between
own and neighbors’ median housing value.
4.3 Estimation approach
As mentioned above, the Michigan open enrollment law requires a school dis-
trict in each year to announce whether in the following school year it will
admit non-resident students at local schools. This is a discrete choice decision
problem which is captured in a latent variable model allowing for time-lagged
spatial effects. The model has been discussed in Section 3.4 and is therefore
only briefly recapitulated here.
Suppose that district i’s predisposition towards the adoption of open en-
rollment in period t is a function of lagged adoption decisions of other districts
{yj, t−1}Nj 6=i, i’s lagged own decision yi, t−1 and a vector of exogenous character-
istics where the first element is unity. A convenient specification for the latent
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variable is
y∗it = zitδ + uit
= φ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij yj, t−1 + λ yi, t−1 + xitβ + uit, (4.1)
The inclusion of yi, t−1 accounts for inertia in the policy process by which
the districts’ participation decision is determined. The parameter of primary
interest in this specification is φ. A non-zero value of φ would imply that the
attitude towards the adoption of open enrollment in any given district depends
on lagged adoption decisions in other districts.
There are a number of issues making the model with time-lagged spatial
effects an attractive choice in the context of this chapter. First of all, the school
districts’ participation decision is the result of a complex political process, and
it seems reasonable to account for a certain time lag when the districts adjust
their behavior to decisions in neighboring districts. The structural equation
(4.1) is a particularly attractive choice in applications where lagged decisions
are good predictors of actual predispositions. As we will see, this is the case
here.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, an important issue that has to be taken into
account in estimating spatial effects is the potential presence of spatial error
correlation. Consider an example with two regions A and B, where districts
in A are more inclined towards school choice than districts in B due to some
common time-invariant unobserved characteristic. With the diffusion rate be-
ing higher in A than in B, the specification in Eq. (4.1) would erroneously
attribute the effect of the unobserved characteristic to neighbors’ past de-
cisions. Hence, accounting for the potential presence of spatially correlated
components in the errors is crucial.
The econometric approach presented in this chapter takes account of spa-
tial error correlation in a simple but straightforward way. The approach takes
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the example of unobserved region-specific effects literally and extends the
structural equation by a number of dummy variables for regions. Of course,
for the approach to make sense these regions have to be defined in a mean-
ingful way. With regard to the Michigan school districts, the natural way
to proceed is to define regions according to Intermediate School Districts as
regional educational service agencies. ISDs are higher level authorities in the
federal educational system of Michigan, and the vertical impact of ISD poli-
cies on local school districts may well lead to spatial correlation in the school
districts’ behavior towards open enrollment. Suppose, for instance, that ISDs
engage in policy coordination among affiliated districts,8 or that ISD officials
have certain preferences towards inter-district school choice and try to affect
policies at the local level accordingly. The dummy variables will take ac-
count of any such region-specific effect on district policies and thereby help
to remove spatial correlation from the errors. A test for the presence of spa-
tial error correlation in a model without interaction among districts is used
to make sure that the approach works. Suppose that the residuals follow a
spatial auto-regressive process,
uit = ρ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij uj, t + ²it, (4.2)
where ² ∼ N(0, IN). Since y∗it is a latent variable, the ordinary residuals are
not observed. The null hypothesis of spatial independence (ρ = 0) is therefore
tested based on generalized residuals using the Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test
for probit models proposed by Pinkse and Slade (1998). Running the test
on generalized residuals from a standard probit and a probit including ISD
dummies will reveal to which extent the inclusion of ISD dummies removes
8Note that under Michigan law ISDs could run their own ISD-wide school choice pro-
grams. Local school districts in these ISDs would then be exempt from the provisions of the
statewide program. See Michigan Compiled Laws, Section 388.1705b (effective since June
1997).
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spatially correlated components from the residuals.
Since the structural equation has yi,t−1 as an explanatory variable, a poten-
tial problem could also arise from serial correlation in u. Unfortunately, the
absence of serial correlation cannot be tested based on a single cross-section of
observations. Instrumenting the potentially endogenous lagged decision would
allow to circumvent this problem. Apart from the fact that the standard ap-
proach of instrumenting in a limited dependent variable framework does not
cover the case of a binary endogenous explanatory variable, it is extremely
difficult to find valid instruments for a lagged dependent variable. In the light
of these difficulties, I use a different approach to check whether the findings on
district interactions are affected by serial correlation in the residuals. Taking
advantage of data on the districts’ school choice policies from 1999 to 2002, I
estimate a probit for the 2002 cross-section with lagged own decisions from the
previous three years and a full set of ISD-dummies as explanatory variables.
With three lags included, the model is likely to account for any unobserved
heterogeneity which might cause the errors in Eq. (4.1) to be serially corre-
lated. Comparing the results from the original model and the model with
additional lags included will then provide evidence on the robustness of the
interaction coefficient.
A further issue is the choice of the weights wij. In general, it is difficult
to define appropriate weights since no general criterion for discriminating be-
tween alternative definitions is available. In the present case, however, things
should be less complicated than in many other applications. Note firstly that
students in 1997 could only transfer to districts within the same ISD. Hence,
policies of districts outside the ISD should not have affected participation de-
cisions. Consequently, the weights should select as neighbors only districts
within the ISD. Secondly, given the costs associated with being enrolled at
a school which is far away from a place of residence, competition for stu-
dents should in most cases take place among adjacent districts. Hence, the
66 Chapter 4
row-standardized spatial weights are defined as
wij =
dij
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
dij
if i 6= j and wij = 0 if i = j,
where dij is an indicator taking value 1 if j belongs to the same ISD and is
adjacent to i, and zero otherwise.
I also experimented with a number of other metrics where, for instance, I
adjusted the weights according to the size of neighbors measured by enrollment
or population. The results were very similar to those obtained with the weights
described here.
A final point in the discussion of the estimation approach relates to the
possibility that the districts’ response to lagged decisions of neighbors sys-
tematically differs between certain groups of districts. A natural asymmetry
to explore is the one between adopters (districts which adopted school choice
in t − 1) and non-adopters. More specifically, I also estimate a model where
neighbors’ policies are interacted with yi, t−1,
y∗it = φ1 yi, t−1
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij yj, t−1
+ φ2 (1− yi, t−1)
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij yj, t−1 + λ yi, t−1 + xitβ + uit. (4.3)
For districts which have adopted open enrollment in t − 1 the second term
on the right hand side of Eq. (4.3) equals zero. Hence, φ1 measures the ex-
tent to which neighbors’ lagged decisions affect current policies of first-period
adopters. If open enrollment has not been adopted in t − 1, the first term
equals zero, and φ2 measures the neighborhood influence on current policies
of those districts which did not adopt open enrollment previously. A differ-
ence between φ1 and φ2 would indicate that it depends on lagged own decisions
how districts are affected by policies in neighboring districts. Of course, other
asymmetries in responses can be analyzed in a similar way.
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Table 4.1: District participation 1996-1997 – descriptive statistics
Full sample Reduced sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Participation in 1997 0.453 0.498 0.494 0.501
Participation in 1996 0.369 0.483 0.391 0.489
Nob 521 338
4.4 Data, estimation and results
The empirical analysis is based on data on 521 Unified School Districts in
Michigan.9 The analysis focuses on the behavior of school districts in the
first two years of the Michigan open enrollment program. Since indicators
for lagged decisions are included in all specifications, the spatial interaction
among districts is identified using the cross-section of districts from the second
year of the program, 1997. Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics on district
participation in 1996 and 1997 both for the sample of 521 districts and a
reduced sample of 338 districts which is used for estimations including ISD
dummies.10
In the first year, 192 out of 521 districts in the sample allowed for enroll-
ment of non-resident students. In 1997, 60 districts joined and 16 districts
left the program. With 236 open enrollment districts, the participation rate
in 1997 was 45.3 percent. Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics on district
9A minority of 30 Michigan school districts runs only elementary schools and is excluded
from the sample. Furthermore, the concept of neighborliness used in this study is not
applicable to two Unified School Districts which are islands. Detroit City School District
served almost 165,000 students in 1997 (about 10 percent of all students in Michigan) and
is excluded as an influential observation.
10The reduction of the sample to only 338 districts in estimations including ISD dummies
is for technical reasons and has nothing to do with the exclusion of districts for the reasons
discussed in footnote 9.
68 Chapter 4
Table 4.2: School choice in 1997 - descriptive statistics (Nob=521)
District characteristics Mean S.D. Min Max
% neighbors participating in 1996a 0.359 0.392 0 1.00
Enrollmentb 2.80 3.30 0.077 26.1
Student teacher ratio 14.9 1.91 7.29 19.7
Revenues per studentc 7.21 1.26 5.35 14.7
% math/reading satisfactory grade 7d 0.557 0.130 0.063 0.896
Difference between own and 0.010 0.278 -1.41 1.98
neighbors’ median housing valuee
Difference between own and -0.038 0.184 -0.896 0.752
neighbors’ % minority students
a Neighbors defined as contiguous districts in own ISD.
b in 1000 students.
c In 1000 $.
d Average percentages of students with satisfactory proficiency in math and reading.
e In 100,000 $.
characteristics for 1997.11
The data on district participation are from Arsen, Plank, and Sykes (1999), p. 33.
Data on enrollment, minority students, teachers, revenues, and math/reading
proficiency are for the 1997/98 school year and have been obtained from the
K-12 database of the Michigan Department of Education, Center for Edu-
cational Performance and Information (CEPI). The data were accessible via
the web page of the Department at the time of writing. Data on the median
value for specified owner-occupied housing units in 1999 are from the School
District Demographic System of the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES).
The first step in the analysis is to run two baseline regressions where the
potential impact of neighbors’ lagged policies is ignored. The baseline regres-
sions are meant as a first test whether the approach of estimating a discrete
choice model for the adoption of open enrollment policies with the given set
11The descriptive statistics for the reduced sample are very similar to those displayed in
Table 4.2 and are omitted.
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Table 4.3: School choice in 1997 – baseline probit estimations
Specification includes ISD-dummies No Yes
Coeff. dP/dX Coeff. dP/dX
Participation in 1996 2.36 ??? 0.718 2.74 ??? 0.635
(0.164) (0.309)
Enrollment -0.014 -0.003 0.026 0.004
(0.026) (0.041)
Student teacher ratio -0.182 ??? -0.038 -0.330 ??? -0.053
(0.045) (0.086)
Revenues per student -0.191 ??? -0.040 -0.354 ??? -0.057
(0.066) (0.124)
% math/reading satisfactory 1.34 ?? 0.278 3.06 ??? 0.489
(0.613) (1.04)
Difference between own and -0.724 ?? -0.150 -1.34 ?? -0.215
neighbors’ median housing value (0.350) (0.529)
Difference between own and 0.388 0.081 0.397 0.063
neighbors’ % minority students (0.487) (0.624)
Nob 521 338
Log-likelihood -196.52 -97.57
Percent correctly predicted 85.6 87.6
p-value for test for
spatial error correlationa,b
0.00 0.608
Standard errors in parentheses.
a Neighbors defined as contiguous districts in own ISD.
b Based on 10,000 replications.
?? 5% significance level.
??? Idem., 1%.
of control variables is meaningful at all. Furthermore, the baseline regressions
will help us to address the issue of spatially correlated unobserved effects.
Table 4.3 reports the results.
The first two columns display coefficients and average partial effects of a
simple probit specification with participation decisions in 1997 as the depen-
dent variable. Five out of the seven explanatory variables show coefficients
significant at least at the 10 percent level, and the model correctly predicts
more than 85 percent of all decisions. As expected, the participation deci-
sion in 1996 is a strong predictor for participation in 1997. Furthermore, the
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coefficients of the student-teacher ratio and the revenue variable are signifi-
cant and show the expected sign. The results also suggest that districts with
higher proficiency levels are more and that districts with housing values above
those in neighboring districts are less inclined towards adopting school choice.
Taken together, the estimation results for the baseline model suggest that a
number of important school district characteristics affecting the adoption of
open enrollment as a district policy have been identified.
The second set of results in Table 4.3 is from a probit of participation
decisions in 1997 on the same set of explanatory variables as before and, in
addition, a full set of ISD dummies. Note that the estimation with ISD dum-
mies is based on a sample of only 338 observations. The reason is that in 22
out of 57 ISDs all affiliated local school districts either adopted open enroll-
ment in 1997, or they all opted out of the program. With dummy variables for
ISDs, these observations have to be removed from the sample in order to avoid
complete separation. With the reduced sample and the additional regressors,
the general picture is the same as before, although the average partial effects of
the student teacher ratio, revenues per student, proficiency level and housing
values now are somewhat more pronounced. This is only partly attributable
to the inclusion of the dummy variables. It also reflects the fact that, after
dropping observations from ISDs with no variation in the dependent variable,
the link between the explanatory variables and participation decisions is more
clearly visible.
As mentioned in the previous section, controlling for region-specific effects
is a straightforward way of removing spatially correlated components from
the residuals. To see how this approach works in the present setting, a LM
test for spatial error correlation has been performed for both specifications.
As suggested by Pinkse and Slade (1998), a bootstrapping method is used to
derive p-values for the null of zero spatial error correlation. This accounts for
the fact that the LM test statistic does not have a limiting χ2-distribution but,
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instead, depends on the matrix of spatial weights. The results are reported
in the last row in Table 4.3. Based on 10,000 replications, the result for the
model without ISD dummies clearly suggests the rejection of the null of zero
spatial correlation in errors. In contrast to this, once region-specific dummies
are included, the p-value of the test reveals that there is no significant amount
of spatial error correlation. Therefore, when moving to specifications with
spatial interaction in adoption decisions, there is little reason to suspect that
the results will be significantly affected by spatially correlated unobserved
effects once the impact of ISDs on district policies is accounted for.
We now turn to estimates of the spatial probit model, where the focus is on
identifying the impact of neighbors’ lagged decisions on actual participation
decisions. A first set of results with the dependent variable being the districts’
decisions in 1997 is displayed in Table 4.4. Note that, as suggested by the
results of the tests reported above, a full set of ISD dummies is included to
remove spatially correlated components from the errors. The main result from
Table 4.4 is that there is positive neighborhood influence in the adoption of
open enrollment policies and that the impact of lagged adoption decisions of
neighbors on current policies is substantial. A one percentage point increase
in the share of neighbors participating in the first year of the school choice
program increases the current probability of adoption by about 0.2 percent,
implying that a district with a share of participating neighbors one standard
deviation above that of an otherwise identical reference district is about 7.8
percent more likely to accept transfer students. A likelihood ratio test on
equality of the log-likelihood of the spatial probit and the baseline probit with
ISD dummies gives a test statistic of 5.48. This is significantly different from
zero at the 2 percent level, implying that not accounting for the impact of
neighbors’ lagged decisions removes a significant amount of information from
the system.
Districts which already adopted open enrollment in 1996 are about 64
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Table 4.4: School choice in 1997 – spatial probit
Coefficient dP/dX
% neighbors participating in 1996a 1.29 ?? 0.200
(0.560)
Participation in 1996 2.83 ??? 0.636
(0.323)
Enrollment 0.023 0.004
(0.043)
Student teacher ratio -.363 ??? -0.056
(0.090)
Revenues per student -.365 ??? -0.057
(0.126)
% math/reading satisfactory 3.32 ??? 0.516
(1.07)
Difference between own and -1.50 ??? -0.233
neighbors’ median housing value (0.542)
Difference between own and 0.385 0.060
neighbors’ % minority students (0.642)
Nob 338
Log-likelihood -94.83
Percent correctly predicted 87.3
Standard errors in parentheses.
Regression includes a full set of ISD dummies.
a Neighbors defined as contiguous districts in own ISD.
?? 5% significance level.
??? Idem., 1%.
percent more likely to allow for the transfer of non-resident students than
districts which did not participate in the first year of the choice program. In
addition, a number of other explanatory variables affect the districts’ choices.
An additional student per teacher decreases the probability of adoption by 5.6
percent, while $ 1,000 of additional revenues per student decrease the partic-
ipation probability by 5.7 percent. These findings support the presumption
that crowded schools and the relative abundance of available resources deter
school districts from actively competing for non-resident students. Further-
more, ceteris paribus, a higher share of students scoring satisfactorily in read-
ing and math increases the probability of adoption. A one percentage point
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increase in the share of proficient students is associated with an increase in the
participation probability of 0.52 percent. This may reflect the fact that better
local schools, holding fixed all other factors, make a district a more attractive
choice for potential transfer students. Introducing inter-district school choice
is therefore more likely to be a successful policy in districts with a high share
of proficient students. Finally, the adoption probability decreases with the
difference between a district’s median housing value and the average median
housing value in neighboring districts. On average, an increase in this dif-
ference by $ 1,000 makes participation in school choice about 0.2 percent less
likely. This points to the fact that households which have invested in their chil-
dren’s education by purchasing (relatively) expensive housing will most likely
suffer a loss in the value of their houses if their school district participates in
inter-district school choice.
As mentioned in the previous section, a problem with the results presented
so far is the potential presence of serial correlation in the errors. If uit is
correlated with ui,t−1, the lagged dependent variable in Eq. (4.1) is endogenous
and the estimates of all coefficients are bound to be inconsistent. Why should
the errors be serially correlated? The most plausible source of serial correlation
in the errors is certainly the presence of an unobserved time-invariant effect in
the equation describing the districts’ predisposition towards open enrolment.
A simple way to address this problem is to include a sufficient number of
lags of the dependent variable as additional regressors. By conditioning on
the observed outcomes from previous periods, we are likely to account for any
important unobserved factors which drive the districts’ participation decisions.
This way of dealing with serial correlation in the errors driven by unobserved
effects is similar in spirit to the approach of Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen
(1995), who analyze technological innovations of firms and propose to utilize
the pre-sample history of innovation activity to account for unobserved effects.
Of course, it is not possible to include a sufficient number of lags with data on
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Table 4.5: District participation 1999-2002 – descriptive statistics
Full sample Reduced sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Participation in 2002 0.704 0.457 0.638 0.481
Participation in 2001 0.645 0.479 0.578 0.495
Participation in 2000 0.610 0.488 0.509 0.501
Participation in 1999 0.478 0.500 0.404 0.491
Nob 521 334
Source: Michigan Department of Education (see footnote 12).
the districts’ participation decisions only from the first two years of the school
choice program. I therefore use information on district participation in the
Michigan school choice program from 1999 to 2002 provided by the Michigan
Department of Education.12 A problem with the data is that they do not
allow to distinguish between school districts which did not participate in the
program and districts which did participate and experienced a zero demand
from non-resident students to be enrolled at the district’s schools.13 In what
is reported below, districts with zero incoming transfer students are treated as
not participating in the school choice program. Note that less than 2.7 percent
of all districts with a strictly positive number of incoming transfer students
report to receive less than two full-time equivalent students. Hence, it is highly
unlikely that the picture of participation decisions emerging from the data by
treating districts with zero transfers as non-participating is seriously biased.
Table 4.5 displays descriptive statistics for district participation from 1999
to 2002 both for the full sample and for a reduced sample of 334 districts.14
Note that the share of participating districts lags behind in the reduced sam-
12The data have been provided by Dr.ArthurVrettas at the Michigan Department of
Education, who was in charge of the Schools of Choice Program at the time of writing.
13It is for this reason that I do not use this data in the main analysis.
14As before, the sample has be to reduced to avoid complete separation in an estimation
including ISD dummies.
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Table 4.6: School choice in 2002 – probit with three lags of dependent variable
Coefficient dP/dX
% neighbors participating in 2001a 1.10 ?? 0.207
(0.499)
Participation in 2001 1.67 ??? 0.349
(0.301)
Participation in 2000 0.767 ?? 0.156
(0.359)
Participation in 1999 0.076 0.014
(0.328)
Nob 334
Log-likelihood -113.53
Percent correctly predicted 85.0
Standard errors in parentheses.
Regression includes a full set of ISD dummies.
a Neighbors defined as contiguous districts in own ISD.
?? 5% significance level.
??? Idem., 1%.
ple. This is because most of the excluded districts are from ISDs with partic-
ipation of all affiliated districts. Results of a probit of district participation
in 2002 on neighbors’ lagged decisions, three lags of the dependent variable
and a full set of ISD dummies are shown in Table 4.6.15 The average par-
tial effect of neighbors’ lagged decisions is about 0.21 compared to 0.2 in the
spatial probit for the 1997 cross section. The impact of participation in the
previous year is now 0.35, which is significantly lower than with only one lag
included. The coefficient of the participation decision lagged by two periods is
also significant. All other things being equal, a district which did participate
two years ago is still about 16 percent more likely to allow for inter-district
transfers. However, the positive effect of lagged adoption decisions is dying
out with more distant lags. If we are willing to believe that the inclusion of
three lags of the dependent variable is likely to remove any significant amount
15Including additional controls as in the regressions reported before did not significantly
alter the estimates of coefficients and average partial effects.
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Table 4.7: School choice in 1997 – probit with asymmetric responses
Coefficient dP/dX
Neighbors’ impact on previous year adoptersa 0.764 0.118
(0.797)
Neighbors’ impact on previous year non-adoptersa 1.52?? 0.235
(0.618)
Nob 338
Log-likelihood -94.41
p-value for Wald test on equality of coefficients 0.357
Standard errors in parentheses.
Additional regressors: see Table 4.4.
a Neighbors defined as contiguous districts in own ISD.
?? 5% significance level.
of serial correlation which might potentially be present in the errors, then the
results displayed in Table 4.6 suggest that the positive and significant estimate
for the interaction coefficient does not suffer from endogeneity bias.
Since the estimate of the spatial interaction coefficient does not seem to
be affected by serially correlated errors, we now return to results derived from
the districts’ participation decisions in the second year of the school choice
program. Table 4.7 presents the estimates for interaction coefficients from a
probit allowing for asymmetric responses between previous year adopters and
previous year non-adopters.16 The hypothesis that previous-year adopters’
choice of current policies is not affected by lagged decisions of neighbors can-
not be rejected at the 10 percent significance level. At the same time, the
interaction coefficient for previous year non-adopters is significant at the 5
percent level. The partial effect indicates that previous-year non-adopters
are 0.24 percent more likely to participate in open enrollment if the share of
previous-year adopters among neighbors is increased by one percentage point.
The results suggest that school districts which did not participate in the first
16The estimates of coefficients and average partial effects for the control variables are
very similar to those obtained before and are omitted.
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year of Michigan’s inter-district school choice program were ‘pulled’ to par-
ticipation in the second year by previous-year adopters in their geographical
environment, while first year adopters seem to have been unaffected by the
behavior of other districts. This finding is consistent with the view that par-
ticipation in the choice program was propagated by its effects on the degree of
competition for students and state funds. Note, however, that the difference in
the estimates for the interaction coefficients is not significant at conventional
levels.
In general, one might think of forces other than competition for non-
resident students making the districts’ participation decisions interdependent.
For instance, some districts may have abstained from participation in the first
year of the program’s existence in order to learn from the experience with the
new policy made by other districts. The positive impact of neighbors’ lagged
decisions could thus also be explained by the notion that the quality and the
amount of information available to districts positively depends on the number
of experiments in nearby districts.17 The Michigan school choice law in its
original formulation offers a simple way to discriminate between the competi-
tion hypothesis and alternative explanations for interdependencies among the
districts’ decisions. As mentioned earlier, the law allowed for inter-district
transfers only within ISDs. Therefore, school districts whose school choice
policies were motivated by concerns about losing students by inter-district
transfers should have reacted to lagged adoption decisions of neighboring dis-
tricts within the ISD, but they should have been indifferent towards decisions
of neighbors outside their ISD. In contrast to this, the difference between
neighbors within and outside the ISD should have played no role if interdepen-
dencies among the districts’ choices were driven by information spillovers. To
17As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a small body of theoretical literature on strategic
behavior of jurisdictions in policy experimenting and policy innovation. See, e.g., Strumpf
(2002) and Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006a).
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Table 4.8: Effect of lagged decisions of neighbors within and outside ISD
Coefficient dP/dX
Lagged decisions of neighbors within ISD 1.25?? 0.192
(0.554)
Lagged decisions of neighbors outside ISD -0.465 -0.072
(0.392)
Nob 338
Log-likelihood -94.12
p-value for Wald test on equality of coefficients 0.010
Standard errors in parentheses.
Additional regressors: see Table 4.4.
?? 5% significance level.
discriminate between the alternative explanations, I estimate a model with the
share of participating neighbors within the ISD and the corresponding share of
adjacent districts outside the ISD included as separate regressors. The results
are shown in Table 4.8. While the estimates for the interaction coefficient and
the corresponding average partial effect for neighbors within the ISD are very
similar to those presented in Table 4.4, the interaction coefficient for adjacent
districts outside the ISD is insignificant. Hence, the average district was only
influenced by adoptions of school choice which did affect the choices available
to students residing in the district. This finding clearly supports the view that
competition for students was the driving force for the districts’ participation
decisions being positively interdependent.
Chapter 5
Strategic interaction in school choice policies:
Additional evidence
5.1 Introduction
Extending the analysis of interaction in the adoption of policy innovations, this
chapter provides evidence on behavioral convergence in school choice policies
among local school districts. As in the Michigan case study, the variation in
choice policies at the district level is exploited by focussing on the adoption of
inter-district public school choice in states where the school districts’ partici-
pation in this sort of school choice is voluntary. The evidence is derived from
a unique data set providing information on school district characteristics and
policies in a large sample of districts. The estimation approach is based on
the spatial autoregressive probit model proposed by Case (1992) and outlined
in Section 3.3. Recall that the spatial structure in Case’s model is required to
fulfill certain regularity conditions. In particular, the matrix of spatial weights
is assumed to be block-diagonal. To accommodate to this particular feature of
Case’s model, a simple and somewhat stylized measure for geographical prox-
imity is used to describe reference districts. More specifically, county borders
are used to define groups of districts which are ‘neighbors’ to one another.
Thus, for any given district, a composite reference district is defined from the
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set of all local school districts belonging to the same county.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following section,
the empirical approach is briefly recapitulated, and some extensions are dis-
cussed. Section 5.3 describes the data, and the estimation results are presented
in Section 5.4.
5.2 Estimation approach
A special feature of the analysis provided in this chapter is that the evidence on
spatial interactions in local school districts’ decisions to adopt choice policies
is based on data describing policies in a sample of local school districts (and
not the population of districts). As mentioned in Section 3.3, the spatial
autoregressive model is an attractive choice for the analysis of such data.
The model does not require the knowledge of policies, y, for all districts in
the population (i.e., all districts in the states under consideration) and can
therefore be estimated based on sample data on y without any difficulty.
Given the mere number of almost 15,000 school districts in the U.S., it
seems reasonable to assume that decision makers at the district level tend
to perceive the situation in nearby districts as particularly informative with
regard to the prospects of new policies. In the present context it is there-
fore less restrictive than in many other applications to use some geographical
structure to build a block-diagonal weight matrix with each block defining a
geographically defined group of ‘neighbors’. For most US states, the natural
geographical structure to define the blocks in W are the county borders. This
is because in many states, counties are regional educational service agencies.1
1As discussed in Chapter 4, Michigan with its Intermediate School Districts as regional
educational service agencies is an exception.
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In those states, county boards of education provide important services to local
school districts and serve as mediators between the state board of education
and local school boards. However, given that a matrix of weights defined ac-
cording to county borders will be similar to other weight matrices based on
geographical proximity, it is a reasonable approach to use weights based on
county affiliation even in states where counties do not have any responsibilities
for public schools and local school districts.
For the reasons given above, the empirical investigation of school choice
policies of US school districts presented in this chapter will rely on the spatial
probit model proposed by Case (1992). Since the model has been discussed
in general terms in Section 3, I will be very brief in outlining the econometric
approach.
Consider the latent variable model from Section 3.3. Let the latent variable
y∗i describe the predisposition of some school district to experiment with a new
policy. Actual adoptions yi are determined as
yi = 1[y
∗
i > 0] i = 1, . . . , N. (5.1)
The structural equation for the predisposition towards adoption of the new
policy is specified as
y∗i = φ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij y
∗
j + xiβ + ui. (5.2)
Recall that the number of districts belonging to county m is denoted as
nm. With the equations sorted by county, a block-diagonal row-standardized
weight matrix W is constructed by setting wij = 1/(nm(i)− 1) if m(j) = m(i)
and wij = 0 otherwise.
The issue of spatial error dependence has also been discussed in Section 3.3.
To facilitate the identification of the interaction coefficient, φ, and the coeffi-
cient from the spatial error process, ρ, I use a spatial moving average together
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with a weight matrix W c which is based on contiguity indicators to model u.
The error process can thus be written as
ui = ρ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wcij ²j + ²i, (5.3)
where the weights are derived from a matrix of contiguity indicators, W˜ , with
w˜ij = 1 if i and j share a common border and w˜ij = 0 otherwise. The
contiguity based weights are computed as
wcij = w˜ij
 N∑
j=1
j 6=i
w˜ij

−1
if i 6= j and wcij = 0 if i = j. (5.4)
5.3 Data
The empirical analysis of inter-district choice policies at the district level is
based on a sample of school districts in Arkansas, California, Idaho, Mas-
sachusetts and Ohio. All five selected states share the common feature that
they established inter-district choice programs between 1989 and 1993 and
that districts were given discretionary power to decide whether they would ad-
mit nonresident students at local schools.2 Thus, with regard to the selected
states, inter-district open enrollment can be considered a policy innovation
implemented at the school district level.
The information on the school districts’ policies towards open enrollment
is from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) 1993/94, providing data on
a large sample of local school districts.3 The Schools and Staffing Survey
2Choice programs started in Arkansas and Ohio in school year 1989/90, in Massachusetts
and Idaho in 1991/92, and in California in 1993.
3To access the data, refer to National Center for Education Statistics (1998). For
technical information, see National Center for Education Statistics (1996).
Strategic interaction in school choice policies: Additional evidence 83
is administered by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). In
the 1993/94 wave, the survey (among numerous other topics) asked districts
whether they had ‘a choice program in which students can enroll in another
school or district outside their attendance area without justification based on
individual special needs’. Districts which affirmed were then asked whether
the program allowed for enrollment of students from other districts. In the
empirical analysis, the answer to this last question is used to determine which
districts did participate in inter-district open enrollment in the 1993/94 school
year. Hence, the dependent variable is defined exactly as in the previous
chapter and captures the districts’ willingness to serve non-resident students
by accepting inter-district transfers.
In the following, the control variables are briefly discussed. They are sim-
ilar to those used in the Michigan case study presented in Chapter 4. In all
five states, fiscal incentives for participation were set by rewarding districts
with additional funds for the admittance of transfer students. Participating
districts could thus hope to raise additional revenues by attracting transfer
students. The model accounts for the fiscal position of districts by including
revenues per student among the control variables. Other explanatory variables
in the empirical specification are district enrollment, the student-teacher ra-
tio, the share of minority students,4 the median household income, and four
dummy variables, one for districts in large or mid-size central cities, one for
suburban school districts, one for elementary school districts and one for high
school districts. In addition, state dummy variables are included. They ac-
count for all kinds of state-specific influences on the predisposition towards
open enrollment, such as differences in school choice laws, state-specific fiscal
incentives for districts promoting participation in open enrollment programs
or the length of time the program was in place at the time of data collection.
4The share of minority students is defined as one minus the share of white non-Hispanic
students.
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Table 5.1: Number of school districts/observations and participation rate, by state
Participation ratea
# districts Nob SASS Nob sample SASS Sample
Arkansas 315 119 84 0.372 0.446
California 1000 192 152 0.294 0.446
Idaho 113 74 40 0.678 0.628
Massachusetts 259 115 102 0.165 0.229
Ohio 611 149 136 0.534 0.524
All 2298 649 514 0.373 0.458
a Weighted by inverse of sampling probabilities.
For the five selected states, the SASS provides information on open en-
rollment policies in 649 local school districts. For the empirical analysis, the
sample was reduced to 514 districts.5 Table 5.1 displays the number of school
districts/observations and the participation rate by state. In the first column,
the total number of local school districts in 1993/94 is provided. Column two
and three show the number of districts sampled in the SASS and the number
of districts used in estimations. The last two columns display the participation
rates, both for the SASS sample and the sample used in estimations. Note
that the participation rates are computed as weighted averages of indicators
for participation, where the weights are defined as the inverse of the sampling
probabilities. The districts covered in the SASS are selected on the basis of a
517 districts had to be excluded from the sample since they represent a whole county, i.e.
they have no neighbors. Another 14 districts had missing values for explanatory variables.
In a next step, districts with less than 800 students were removed from the sample. The
reason for doing so is the presumption that the political behavior of a very small district
will resemble that of an average school more closely than that of a larger district. The
threshold of 800 students was determined by increasing the minimum number of students
by increments of 100 (starting from zero) until each of the remaining districts had at least
two schools. Finally, in order to identify influential observations, a linear probability model
was estimated using the remaining 539 observations. Based on the approach proposed by
Krasker, Kuh, and Welsch (1983), 25 observations were removed. This left 514 school
districts for the analysis.
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complex survey design, with considerable variation in sampling probabilities.
School districts in large central urban areas, for instance, are sampled with a
high probability to account for the fact that the overall number of such dis-
tricts is relatively small. In contrast to this, districts belonging to the huge
number of rural districts are sampled with a relatively low probability. Using
the inverse of the sampling probabilities as weights corrects for distortions
which result from the survey design. Descriptive statistics accounting for the
variation in the sampling probability should not systematically differ from the
respective statistics based on a random sample of school districts.
A further point worth to be mentioned with regard to Table 5.1 are the
differences in participation rates between the SASS sample and the sample
used in estimations. One reason for this difference to be significantly negative
for Arkansas, California and Massachusetts is the exclusion of districts with
less than 800 students. Both the participation rate of these districts and
their sampling probability in the SASS is below average. Since low sampling
probabilities translate into high weights, the positive effect of dropping very
small districts from the sample on the average participation rates is clearly
visible.
As shown in Section 3.3, the identification of the parameters of the spa-
tial probit model from its reduced form requires information on mean district
characteristics by county. In Case (1992), survey data are used to estimate
the mean characteristics. I use a more robust approach and derive mean char-
acteristics from the population of districts. To do so, data sources providing
information on all US school districts are used. The data are from the Public
Education Finance Data of the Bureau of the Census (revenues and district
type indicator), the School District Demographic System of the NCES (median
household income6) and the Common Core of Data of the NCES (enrollment,
6Data on median household income is from 1999.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics (Nob=514)
Meana S.D.a Min Max
Number of neighborsb 17.7 18.4 1.00 80.0
Central city 0.105 0.307 0 1.00
Suburb 0.302 0.459 0 1.00
Elementary school district 0.091 0.287 0 1.00
High school district 0.032 0.177 0 1.00
Enrollmentc 5.36 8.25 0.803 127
Student-teacher ratio 19.7 3.54 11.9 29.5
% minority students 0.206 0.252 0.00 0.960
Revenues per studentd 5.00 1.19 2.97 11.5
Median household incomed 39.7 13.2 17.1 98.2
a Weighted by inverse of sampling probabilities.
b Number of districts belonging to the same county.
c In 1000 students.
d In 1000 $ and 1993 prices.
number of minority students, number of teachers, and urbanicity indicator).
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used in estimation.
5.4 Estimation and results
All estimations based on the SASS data have to account for the distortions
induced by the sample design. With regard to parameter estimation, the
effect of the survey design on the composition of the sample is accounted
for by including the inverse of the sampling probabilities as a weights in the
likelihood function. In addition, the weights have to be taken into account
in the computation of the coefficients’ asymptotic variance-covariance matrix.
The best way to proceed is to use a Huber-White formula for probit models.
Suppose we want to compute robust standard errors for a K-dimensional
vector of coefficients, γ. Let the log-likelihood function be
L(γ) =
N∑
i=1
Li(γ) =
N∑
i=1
αi[yi lnG(γ, zi) + (1− yi) ln(1−G(γ, zi))], (5.5)
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where G(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution with density g(·)
and αi is the weight of i. In general, a robust asymptotic variance-covariance
matrix looks like
Âvar(γˆ) = H−1
N∑
i=1
sisi
′ H−1, (5.6)
where H is the Hessian evaluated at γˆ and si is the score vector,
si =

∂Li(γ,zi)
∂γ1
∂Li(γ,zi)
∂γ2
...
∂Li(γ,zi)
∂γK

. (5.7)
For a model with a linear index the score vector has a particular simple form,
si =
αig(ziγ)zi
′[yi −G(ziγ)]
G(ziγ)[1−G(ziγ)] . (5.8)
Of course, the score vector for the reduced form of the spatial autoregressive
probit with its non-linear index function would look a bit more involved.
The first step in the empirical analysis is a simple baseline regression where
the potential impact the predispositions of neighbors may have on the attitude
towards open enrollment in any given district is ignored. Again, the baseline
regression is meant as a first, albeit crude test whether the estimation approach
can be expected to give meaningful results. Table 5.3 reports the results of
a weighted maximum likelihood estimation of a standard probit framework.
The latent variable model is specified as
y∗i = xiβ + ui, (5.9)
where xi includes a constant and the control variables discussed above. The
first column displays the parameter estimates for the baseline specification
model, the second column gives robust standard errors, and the third col-
umn provides the average partial effects, i.e. the sample averages of estimated
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Table 5.3: Baseline Probit
Coefficient S.E. Slopea
Central city 0.007 0.236 0.003
Suburb -0.290 0.194 -0.105
Elementary school district 0.404 0.294 0.145
High school district -0.456 0.407 -0.164
Enrollmentb 0.010 0.008 0.004
Student-teacher ratio -0.107?? 0.047 -0.039
% minority students -0.951?? 0.412 -0.343
Revenues per studentc -0.269??? 0.098 -0.097
Median household incomec -0.001 0.007 -0.000
Log-likelihood -323.27
Percent correctly predicted 66.1
Estimation equation includes state dummies as additional regressors.
Standard errors are Huber-White accounting for sampling weights.
a Weighted average of estimated changes in probabilities.
b In 1000 students.
c In 1000 $.
?? 5% significance level.
??? Idem., 1%.
changes in the probability of adoption associated with a change in the ex-
planatory variable. A quick inspection of the results shows that districts with
crowded schools, as we presumed, seem to be less willing to open up their
local schools for non-resident students. Furthermore, districts with a higher
share of minority students are less likely to participate. In addition, districts
with lower revenues per student are more inclined towards open enrollment
than high revenue districts.
The significance of a number of district characteristics together with the
fact that the model correctly predicts almost two thirds of all adoption deci-
sions suggests that all explanatory variables together provide a strong signal
for the predisposition of school districts to participate in open enrollment pro-
grams. Thus we can hope that the spatial autoregressive model, where we rely
on neighbors’ mean characteristics in order to identify the impact of neighbors
predispositions towards adoption, is capable to provide significant results on
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Table 5.4: Spatial autoregressive probit
SAR model SARMA model
Coefficient Slopea Coefficient Slopea
Neighbors’ predisposition, φ 0.440 ?? - 0.504 ??? -
(0.174) (0.192)
Central city -0.058 -0.021 -0.041 -0.015
(0.235) (0.207)
Suburb -0.221 -0.082 -0.186 -0.071
(0.176) (0.175)
Elementary school district 0.377 0.139 0.343 0.130
(0.263) (0.257)
High school district -0.699? -0.258 -0.739? -0.280
(0.418) (0.396)
Enrollmentb 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.003
(0.008) (0.008)
Student-teacher ratio -0.105??? -0.039 -0.093 ?? -0.035
(0.041) (0.043)
% minority students -0.689?? -0.254 -0.617? -0.234
(0.349) (0.338)
Revenues per studentc -0.234??? -0.086 -0.199 ?? -0.075
(0.084) (0.096)
Median household incomec -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005)
Spatial correlation - - -0.667 ?? -
in errors, ρ (0.315)
Log-likelihood -319.97 -319.35
Percent correctly predicted 65.4 65.8
Estimation equation includes state dummies as additional regressors.
Huber-White standard errors accounting for sampling weights in parentheses.
a Weighted average of estimated individual changes in probabilities.
b In 1000 students.
c In 1000 $.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
potential interdependencies among districts.
Results for the spatial autoregressive probit are presented in Table 5.4.
The first two columns display coefficients and average partial effects for the
SAR model. Recall that in this model, the errors are assumed to be i.i.d.
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The results for the SAR model suggest that predispositions towards adop-
tion of inter-district open enrollment are positively interdependent among
school districts. The positive and significant coefficient for the spatial lag,
φ, measuring the impact of composite neighbors’ attitudes on the predisposi-
tion towards adoption, indicates that open enrollment policies of local school
districts are significantly affected by the anticipated behavior of neighboring
districts. Apart from the predisposition of neighbors, a number of district
characteristics affect the discrete choice decision whether to participate in
open enrollment. High school districts are about 26 percent less likely to al-
low for inter-district transfers relative to unified school districts. As expected,
districts with crowded schools are less inclined towards admitting transfer
students. An additional student per teacher lowers the probability that open
enrollment policies are adopted by 0.039. At the same time, a one percentage
point increase in a district’s share of minority students, with all other things
being equal, makes the district 0.25 percent less likely to adopt open enroll-
ment. This may reflect the fact that districts with a higher share of minority
students will, on average, expect to be less successful in attracting students
from elsewhere. Thus, it may not be worthwhile for these districts to ad-
just their policies towards open enrollment regulations. Furthermore, higher
revenues per student make districts less willing to participate in inter-district
school choice. $ 1000 of additional revenues per student make the average
district 8.6 percent less likely to admit non-resident students.
The next step in the analysis is to check whether the results of the SAR
model are biased by spatial error correlation. This is done by estimating
a spatial autoregressive moving average (SARMA) probit, where the struc-
tural model is given by Eq. (5.2) together with Eq. (5.3). The output for the
SARMA model is displayed as the second set of results in Table 5.4. The first
and most important thing to note is that allowing for spatial error dependence
does not break the link between neighbors’ predispositions. On the contrary,
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the link becomes even stronger: The estimate for φ increases, and it is sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level. At the same time, some evidence is found for
the presence of negative spatial error correlation. Note that accounting for
spatial error dependence does only marginally increase the log-likelihood of
the model. At the same time, the ability of the model to correctly predict the
school districts’ decisions is slightly strengthened. We can conclude that the
positive spatial correlation in adoption decisions is not driven by spatial error
correlation.
The results for the control variables are similar to those derived from the
SAR model and need not be discussed again in full detail. However, it is
worth to note that the average partial effects of the student-teacher ratio and
revenues per student are well in line with the corresponding results presented
in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.4).
One could question the significance of the spatial effect in modelling the
school districts’ behavior towards school choice with reference to the share of
correctly predicted decisions as a measure for the goodness of fit. Although the
percent correctly predicted is very similar for all models, the baseline model
outperforms the spatial probit models in terms of predicting the districts’
choices. Therefore, as an additional check for the significance of the spatial
effect, I computed the corresponding likelihood ratio test statistics. For the
null hypothesis that the log-likelihood values are equal for the baseline and
the SAR model, the statistic is 6.61. With one degree of freedom, this is
significantly different from zero at the 2 percent level. For the test comparing
the baseline model with the SARMA model, the statistic is 7.84. With two
degrees of freedom, this is significant at the 2 percent level, too. The results
of the likelihood ratio tests reveal that not accounting for the neighborhood
influence removes a significant amount of information from the system.
Table 5.4 does not provide average partial effects for neighbors’ predispo-
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Table 5.5: Non-linear least squares
Coefficient S.E.
Adoptions of neighbors, φ 0.339 ??? 0.125
Central city -0.040 0.089
Suburb -0.098?? 0.051
Elementary school district 0.214 ?? 0.085
High school district -0.157 0.183
Enrollmenta 0.003 0.005
Student-teacher ratio -0.050??? 0.012
% minority students -0.406??? 0.137
Revenues per studentb -0.096??? 0.026
Median household incomeb -0.002 0.002
Estimation equation includes state dummies as additional regressors.
a In 1000 students.
b In 1000 $.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
sitions. The reason has been discussed in Section 3.3: φ is the coefficient of a
latent variable with unknown scale, and it is therefore impossible to evaluate
the average partial effect with regard to y∗.
To get an impression of the strength of the neighborhood influence, it is
useful to estimate a spatial linear probability model. Recall from Section 3.2
that this model can be written as
yi = φ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij yj + xiβ + ui. (5.10)
Since the information on y is incomplete, a reduced form is constructed along
the same lines as described for the spatial autoregressive probit in Section 3.3.
The reduced form is then estimated by non-linear least squares. Of course,
given that the school districts’ policies are discrete responses, the linear proba-
bility model cannot be fully appropriate. Furthermore, the estimation ignores
the issue of spatial error dependence. Bearing the limitations of the underlying
model in mind, the results presented in Table 5.5 should rather be viewed to
suggest an order of magnitude of the interaction effect than to provide robust
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evidence on it.
The estimate of the interaction coefficient suggests that in their open en-
rollment policies, the school districts are heavily influenced by their neighbors’
actual policies. A one percentage point increase in the share of neighboring
districts allowing for inter-district transfers is estimated to make participation
0.34 percent more likely. Again, this is broadly in line with the magnitude of
the interaction effect derived from the model with time-lagged spatial effects
and the data on the Michigan Open Enrollment Program in Chapter 4 (see
Table 4.4).

Chapter 6
Spatial effects in charter school policies:
Evidence from California school districts
6.1 Introduction
The policy innovation under consideration in this chapter is charter schools
established under the authority of local school districts. Charter schools are
public schools operating independently from the existing school district struc-
ture. They are exempt from many state and district regulations and provide
school officials and teachers with additional professional opportunities. By
providing additional choice for parents and students, charter schools also tend
to increase competition in the public school system.
The aim of the chapter is to provide evidence on interdependencies among
school districts’ policies towards charter schools. The evidence is based on
charter school policies of California school districts after the state legislature
enacted a charter school law in 1992. The analysis is based on two different
empirical approaches. The first approach is a finite spatial lag model based
on the spatial autoregressive model proposed by Case (1992) and discussed
in Section 3.3. The original model is extended in two directions. Firstly,
it is applied to panel data of innovations instead of pure cross-section data.
95
96 Chapter 6
This allows to account for unobserved heterogeneity in a model of innovation
activity with both dynamic and spatial effects. Secondly, a finite spatial lag
version of the model is used. This, in contrast to the original model, allows
to experiment with various spatial structures. Secondly, a cross-sectional IV
probit model as described in Section 3.5 is estimated for each year of data.
The spatial dependence in the districts’ predisposition towards charter
schools is modelled using a new metric of neighborliness which accounts for the
small-scale mobility of workers in terms of district-to-district commuting flows.
The intuition for this metric is simple: For each district, a set of reference dis-
tricts is defined. It consists of all districts which are in sufficiently similar
commuting distance to the average commuter workplace. For the reference
districts, the degree of neighborliness is determined according to differences
in median household income. The proposed metric clearly outperforms met-
rics relying on simple measures of geographical proximity. Most importantly,
the impact of neighbors on actual district policies towards charter schools is
estimated much more precisely.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 describes charter schools as
a school district policy innovation in California. Section 6.3 describes how
data on district-to-district commuting flows are used to construct a spatial
weighting scheme for the California school districts. Section 6.4 sets out the
finite spatial lag probit model as the first empirical approach and presents the
results derived from applying this model. The second empirical approach, the
IV probit, and the corresponding results are presented in Section 6.5.
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6.2 Background: Charter schools in California
A charter school is a publicly funded school that, in accordance with an en-
abling state statute, has been granted a charter exempting it from selected
state or local rules and regulations. It is typically governed by a group or
organization under a contract or charter with the state or the local school
district. California has been the second state to enact a charter school law in
1992. The law specifies that local school districts may sign a contract with any
one or more persons in order to establish a charter school. Although charter
schools are part of the public school system, they operate independently from
the existing school district structure. They are exempt from most state and
district regulations and benefit from substantial autonomy with regard to the
curriculum, teaching methods, hiring decisions, and other spending decisions.
Since state and district money in California basically follows students, the
funding of charter schools is similar to those of traditional public schools.1
As explicitly mentioned in the law, it was the intent of the California Leg-
islature to ‘encourage the use of different and innovative teaching methods’,
to ‘create new professional opportunities for teachers, including the opportu-
nity to be responsible for the learning program at the schoolsite’, to ‘provide
parents and pupils with expanded choices in the types of educational oppor-
tunities that are available within the public school system’, and to ‘provide
vigorous competition within the public school system to stimulate continual
improvements in all public schools’.2
In California, charter schools can also be authorized by county offices of
education and the Department of Education. However, the vast majority of
charter schools has been established by local school districts. From 1993 to
1For details on the California school finance scheme, see Hoxby (2001) and references
given there.
2The California Charter Schools Act is available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp.
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2002, among the almost 1,000 school districts in California, 219 signed at least
one charter contract. By the end of 2002, the total number of charters under
the authority of local school districts was 490.
6.3 A metric of neighborliness based on commuting flows
In this chapter, various weighting schemes are used to define a composite
neighbor for each school district. Together with weighting schemes similar
to those used in previous chapters, a new metric of neighborliness of local
jurisdictions based on commuting flows is proposed and applied. Although a
technical description of all schemes is given in the chapter appendix, it seems
useful to present the underlying idea and intuition of the commuting-based
weighting scheme already at this point.
Given the mere number of almost 1,000 school districts in California, it
seems reasonable to assume that in general decision makers at the district
level are able to track conditions for policymaking and actual decisions only
in a small fraction of all districts. In addition, one can expect the degree
to which a given district is considered a reference district by local decision
makers to sharply decline with geographical distance. One reason for this to
hold is that households, once we take the location of jobs as given, can choose
their residence only within commuting distance to the workplace. Thus, for
the typical household, the quality of public schools matters only as far as
districts within commuting distance to the workplace are concerned. As long
as (re-)location decisions of households are a primary concern of local decision
makers, we should therefore expect to find interactions in local school policies
among districts which, from the point of view of the average household, belong
to the same local educational market. Furthermore, the average household will
consider to move to another district only if social conditions, amenities and
Spatial effects in charter school policies: Evidence from California 99
housing prices are sufficiently similar to those at the actual place of residence.
There are, of course, various ways how to determine which districts belong
to the same educational market. However, since commuting distances are cru-
cial for location decisions of households, it seems reasonable to define local
educational markets with respect to observed commuting flows. In the follow-
ing, I give the intuition of a simple measure of geographical proximity which
is derived from district-to-district workflow data. The commuting-based dis-
tance measure can be used to derive spatial weights which, implicitly, define
local educational markets. Although the computation of the distance measure
described below is computationally demanding for a large number of local
jurisdictions, the intuition is straightforward.
The first step in deriving a commuting-based distance measure for a pair
of districts is to compute, for both districts, the share of residents commuting
to each of the remaining districts. The distance δ is then computed as the
sum of differences in those shares in absolute values,
δij =
N∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
∣∣∣∣∣ nik∑l 6=i,j nil − njk∑l 6=i,j njl
∣∣∣∣∣ , (6.1)
where nik is the number of commuters from i working in k. Note that by
construction, δ ∈ [0, 2]. By applying a suitable distance-decay function to
the commuting-based distance measures, it is easy to transform distances into
spatial weights. Intuitively speaking, spatial weights based on the commuting-
based distance measure state a high degree of neighborliness if, for the average
commuter, both districts are in similar commuting distance to the average
commuter workplace.
To illustrate the derivation of commuting-based weights, consider an ar-
bitrary example with four districts named A, . . . , D. Suppose the matrix of
100 Chapter 6
inter-district commuting flows looks like
A B C D
A
B
C
D

0 300 0 200
800 0 200 0
200 200 0 200
400 100 100 0
 , (6.2)
where in row i = A, . . . , D the number of commuters from i to all other
districts is displayed. The matrix of distances derived from the commuting
flows is
∆ij =

0 2 0.2 1
2 0 1 0
0.2 1 0 0.6
1 0 0.6 0
 . (6.3)
A convenient choice for the distance-decay function is exp(−δ).3 After row-
standardization, the resulting matrix of weights is
W =

0 0.102 0.619 0.278
0.090 0 0.245 0.665
0.472 0.212 0 0.316
0.192 0.522 0.286 0
 . (6.4)
Note how the similar patterns of commuting flows originating from districts
A and C translate into high weights wAC and wCA. The same holds for
commuting from B and D. In contrast to this, commuting flows originating
from A and B are very dissimilar. Accordingly, the weights wAB and wBA are
relatively small.
In many applications, the pattern of commuting flows of a typical jurisdic-
tions will resemble the patterns of only a limited number of other jurisdictions,
while the patterns of many other jurisdictions will be very dissimilar. Since
the distances derived from commuting flows are bounded from above by 2,
3The distance-decay function is only applied to off-diagonal elements, while elements
on the diagonal are set to zero.
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it may be useful to truncate the resulting weights by setting ‘small’ weights
to zero. An extreme example would be a matrix of truncated weights select-
ing only the ‘nearest neighbor’. In our example, after row-standardizing the
weights matrix selecting nearest neighbors would be
W tr =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
 . (6.5)
With regard to the weights derived from inter-district commuting in Califor-
nia, a less extreme truncation is applied. The median number of non-zero
weights per row in the matrix of truncated weights is 22.
As alternative criteria to define a set of neighbors for each district, I use
geographic contiguity (neighbors are those districts sharing a border) and
affiliation to counties (neighbors are those districts belonging to the same
county). These are necessarily crude measures of geographical proximity, but
they are easy to obtain and may serve as a point of reference for the more
flexible metric based on commuting flows.
To account for the fact that only districts with relatively similar social
and economic conditions will be considered as alternative places of residence,
I also include in the computation of weights a measure for the similarity be-
tween districts in terms of household income. This is done by substituting all
non-zero weights based on commuting patterns, contiguity or county borders
by exp(−|MHIi −MHIj|), where MHI is the median household income in
10,000 $. Of course, with respect to the commuting based weights, the sub-
stitution has to be done after truncating ‘small’ weights. For districts with
similar (dissimilar) median household income, the resulting weights will be
relatively large (small).
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6.4 Applying a finite spatial lag probit for panel data
6.4.1 Estimation approach
While looking at the diffusion of some new political technology among local
jurisdictions, we often observe a small group with a high level of activity
while the majority of jurisdictions do not adopt the new policy. Often, the
difference in adoption behavior will not be solely attributable to differences in
the jurisdictions’ observable characteristics. Unobserved heterogeneity among
jurisdictions is likely to play an important role among the factors driving the
observed innovation activity. Therefore, whenever possible, panel data should
be used to estimate empirical models of innovation activity in the public sector.
However, even in applications without spatial dependence, the estimation
of limited dependent variable models with unobserved effects is complicated
by a number of methodological issues. The standard model is the fixed effects
logit.4 The log likelihood of the model is written conditional on ni =
∑T
t=1 yit,
and units of observation with ni = 0 or ni = T cannot be informative for
estimating the parameters. Therefore, the fixed effects logit should not be
used to estimate the determinants of innovation activity when yit = 1 is a rare
event. The situation becomes even more involved when the structural equa-
tion incorporates (functions of) lags of the dependent variable. In these cases,
the strict exogeneity assumption on the explanatory variables cannot be met,
and the standard approaches to deal with unobserved heterogeneity cannot
be applied. Recently, techniques have been proposed to deal with unobserved
effects in discrete choice panel data models when the strict exogeneity assump-
tion does not hold. Wooldridge (1997) has proposed a transformation which
eliminates a multiplicative unobserved effect and provides moment conditions
which can be exploited in GMM estimation. The technique is applicable quite
4See Wooldridge (2002), p. 490-92 for a discussion.
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generally and may be used to estimate count data as well as discrete choice
models with unobserved effects. Montalvo (1997) contains a similar approach.
Apart from problems to apply the proposed techniques to small samples and in
cases with explanatory variables moving slowly over time, it is an open ques-
tion how GMM approaches with quasi-differencing could be used to estimate
models incorporating spatial effects.
In the light of these difficulties, I use an alternative approach to account
for unobserved effects proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1995).
In their study on technological innovations, the authors use the pre-sample
history of the variable of interest to control for permanent unobservable dif-
ferences across firms. Adapting this argument, I argue that there are two main
sources of unobserved heterogeneity among local school districts. Firstly, res-
idents and school district officials may differ with respect to their preferences
for a new policy in a way that cannot be inferred from observable district
characteristics. Secondly, school districts may have different knowledge stocks
with regard to running innovative policies. The idea of the approach is to
attempt to measure the unobserved heterogeneity by the level of innovation
activity that has been observed during some period of time before the unit
of observation enters the sample. Technically, this requires defining a ‘pre-
sample’ period and including measures for the innovation activity during this
period as proxies for a permanent unobserved effect in the latent variabel
equation. Of course, since observations from the pre-sample period cannot be
used in estimation, in defining this period one has to compromise between the
quality of the approximation of the unobserved effect and the effective sample
size. In the estimations presented below, the period 1993-1997 is defined as
the pre-sample period, and the period 1998-2002 is used in estimation.
Since only 8 percent of all California school districts take action in the es-
tablishment of charter schools between 1993 and 1997, relying on the number
of authorized schools would clearly not suffice to obtain a reasonable approx-
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imation of the unobserved effect. To alleviate this problem, I make use of
information about two related innovative district policies. The first one is
the policy towards magnet schools. A magnet program is any program or
school within a school designed to attract students away from their school of
residence. A magnet program is established and operates on the basis of a
particular curriculum theme and/or a particular instructional mode or struc-
ture, and may or may not be intended for achieving racial balance. Secondly,
I utilize information about district policies towards independent study pro-
grams. Having such a program means that individualized education plans are
designed to meet the need of individual students. As part of this plan, the
student may enter into an agreement with the district to complete specific
assignments under the supervision of a teacher. As proxies for the unob-
served heterogeneity, I include the number of authorized pre-sample charters,
a dummy indicating the existence of a magnet program during the pre-sample
period, a similar dummy for an independent study program, and a dummy in-
dicating a zero value in all three proxies describing the pre-sample innovation
activity. The last dummy is included to account for the fact that all three
proxies are bounded below by zero.
In the following, the empirical model is described more formally. In each
school year, any given school district faces the discrete choice decision problem
whether to establish one or more charter schools. The model is supposed to
explain the observed choices. In setting up the model, Eq. (3.4) is modified
by adding subscripts for time periods and proxy variables for a time-constant
unobserved effect. The structural equation is written as
y∗it = φ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wijy
∗
jt + xitβ + ciγ + uit, i = 1, . . . , N t = 1, . . . , T, (6.6)
where ci is the (1 × 4) vector of proxies and γ is the corresponding vector
of coefficients. In order to separate spatial correlation in the latent variables
from spatial error correlation, the u’s are allowed to be spatially correlated
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according to
uit = ρ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij²jt + ²it, (6.7)
where ²it is assumed to be homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. Note that
this form of spatial error dependence assumes zero correlation among errors
of neighbors of second and higher order.
For |φ| < 1 and appropriately defined weights, repeated substitution in a
stacked version of Eq. (6.6) provides us with
y∗t = (I + φW + φ
2W 2 + · · · )(xtβ + cγ + ut). (6.8)
The difficulties in estimating the reduced form of the spatial autoregressive
model have been discussed in Section 3.3. A simple way to generalize the
approach proposed by Case (1992) is to approximate the true reduced form
equation by the finite spatial lag model
y∗t = D (xtβ + cγ + ut), (6.9)
where
D ≡ I + φW + φ2W 2 + φ3W 3. (6.10)
The main advantage of the finite spatial lag model is that estimation does not
require any restriction on the W matrix.5 As described in Section 3.3, the
variance-normalizing transformation proposed by Case (1992) is used before
estimation to restore homoscedasticity.
The vector of district characteristics includes the school district’s size (en-
rollment), its ethnic composition (share of minority students), the student-
teacher ratio, the share of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, an
5To check for any bias that might be induced by the approximation, I used a block
diagonal W matrix based on the districts’ affiliation to counties and estimated both the
true reduced form and the finite spatial lag model. The results were almost identical.
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indicator for districts located in central cities, and indicators for elementary
and high schools districts.
6.4.2 Data
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics on the establishment of charter schools
between 1998 and 2002 and on the covariates used in the empirical analysis.
Data on California charter schools come from the California Department of
Education.6 Data on the location of districts relative to urban areas are from
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES, Common Core of Data
(CCD), Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey Data).
Data on district types, enrollment, teachers, minority students, and students
eligible for free or reduced price lunch are provided by the California De-
partment of Education (California Basic Educational Data System (CBEDS),
Public School Enrollment and Staffing and CalWORKS Data Files). Data on
alternative education programs used to approximate unobserved effects are
from the CBEDS School Information Form (SIF), Sections G.
For the construction of spatial weights I used place-to-place commuting
data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (CTPP 2000 Part 3 journey-
to-work (JTW) tables) and data on district median household income from
the NCES School District Demographics System.
6.4.3 Results
Table 6.2 presents results for the finite spatial lag probit explaining the es-
tablishment of charter schools by California school districts in the years 1998-
2002. The weight matrix used in the underlying regressions defines a com-
6See the Charter School Locator, online available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/si/cs.
Spatial effects in charter school policies: Evidence from California 107
Table 6.1: California school districts - descriptive statistics
Mean S.D. Min Max
Indicator for at least one additional charter 0.048 0.214 0 1.00
Enrollmenta 6.16 25.5 0.007 747
Student teacher ratio 19.5 3.19 4.10 50.6
% minority students 0.450 0.281 0 1.00
% students free lunch 0.431 0.266 0 1.00
Central city 0.127 0.333 0 1.00
Suburb 0.470 0.499 0 1.00
Elementary school district 0.591 0.492 0 1.00
High school district 0.090 0.287 0 1.00
Fixed effect (FE) proxies
FE1: Number of charters 0.133 0.639 0 10.0
FE2: Magnet program 0.102 0.303 0 1.00
FE3: Independent study program 0.573 0.495 0 1.00
FE4: Zero innovation activity 0.399 0.490 0 1.00
Balanced panel of 941 California school districts, 1998-2002. The FE proxies are based on
the pre-sample period 1993-1997.
a In 1000 students.
posite neighbor for each district based on the districts’ affiliation to counties.
The results displayed are based on a balanced panel of 941 districts.7 The
table reports coefficients, standard errors and average partial effects (slopes)
for two estimations, one where the spatial weights are determined without any
consideration of differences in median household income, and one where those
differences are taken into account. Estimation results are shown for the spatial
lag, an indicator for at least one additional charter school in the previous three
periods, and the proxy variables for the fixed effect derived from innovation
activity in the years 1993-1997. The results for the remaining covariates are
omitted. The coefficient of the spatial lag, φ, represents the impact of the
composite neighbor’s predisposition towards the establishment of additional
charter schools on the district’s own predisposition. The estimated φ’s show
a positive sign in both specifications. However, as long as the definition of
7I had to exclude some districts due to changes in school district boundaries.
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Table 6.2: Spatial probit, composite neighbor based on counties
Coefficient S.E. Slopea
Weighting scheme A: Weights do
not account for income differences
Spatial lag, φ 0.103 0.147 -
Charter in previous three years 0.471 ??? 0.119 0.038
FE1: 0.135 ?? 0.060 0.011
FE2: 0.169 0.107 0.014
FE3: -0.157 0.232 -0.013
FE4: -0.433? 0.235 -0.035
Weighting scheme B : Weights do
account for income differences
Spatial lag, φ 0.234 ? 0.121 -
Charter in previous three years 0.467 ??? 0.118 0.038
FE1: 0.132 ?? 0.059 0.011
FE2: 0.157 0.108 0.013
FE3: -0.176 0.229 -0.014
FE4: -0.455? 0.234 -0.037
Probit on balanced panel of 941 districts (1998 to 2002).
Standard errors (S.E.) are robust for serial correlation in scores.
Estimations account for spatial error correlation.
Other covariates include district type dummies, city and suburb dummies, a Los Angeles
City Unified dummy, enrollment, student-teacher ratio, %minority students, % students
free lunch, and year effects.
Log of likelihood: −765.86 (weighting scheme A), −764.90 (weighting scheme B).
a Average of estimated individual changes in probabilities.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
composite neighbors does not account for differences in median household in-
come, the null of zero spatial dependence cannot be rejected at conventional
levels of significance. If those differences are used to differentiate the weights
among reference districts, the coefficient of the spatial lag is weakly significant.
The coefficients of the indicator for lagged establishments of charter schools
are positive and highly significant. The average partial effects indicate that
districts which signed a charter in the previous three years are 3.8 percent
more likely to authorize additional schools. In addition, two of the four proxy
variables for the fixed effect are significant at least at the 10 percent level. As
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expected, districts which were early movers in establishing charter schools are
more likely to sign charters for additional schools. At the same time, districts
which did not use any of the included innovative policies during the pre-sample
period are significantly less likely to set up charter schools. The results for the
FE proxies can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, early movers may be more
experienced with innovative policies, and this may positively affect their will-
ingness to sign additional charters. Secondly, the proxy variables may account
for the impact of unobservable, time-invariant district effects.
Corresponding results for contiguity based spatial weights are displayed in
Table 6.3. Again, the model fails to detect any interdependence in the predis-
position towards the establishment of charter schools if differences in median
household income among districts belonging to the same local educational
market are ignored. As before, a weakly significant positive effect is found
with income differences taken into account. The coefficients and average par-
tial effects of the lagged dependent variable and the FE proxies are similar to
those derived before and need not be discussed again.
From the results discussed so far it would be difficult to assess whether the
diffusion of charter schools among California school districts was significantly
affected by interactions among local school boards. Have the school districts
by and large been unaffected by their neighbors, or did the model fail to de-
tect an interaction among districts which was actually present? The results
displayed in Table 6.4 suggest a straight answer to this question. Now, the
weights are based on the similarity of district-to-district commuting patterns.
As before, the null that spatial interaction among districts is absent can not
be rejected if differences in median household income are not taken into ac-
count. However, in contrast to the results discussed so far, the coefficient of
the spatial lag is found to be significant at the 1 percent level with spatial
weights being defined as interactions between commuting-based indicators for
reference districts and the measure for the similarity of median household in-
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Table 6.3: Spatial probit, composite neighbor based on contiguity
Coefficient S.E. Slopea
Weighting scheme C : Weights do
not account for income differences
Spatial lag, φ 0.090 0.173 -
Charter in previous three years 0.474 ??? 0.122 0.040
FE1: 0.139 ?? 0.059 0.012
FE2: 0.172 ? 0.105 0.015
FE3: -0.143 0.228 -0.012
FE4: -0.429? 0.231 -0.036
Weighting scheme D : Weights do
account for income differences
Spatial lag, φ 0.230 ? 0.132 -
Charter in previous three years 0.491 ??? 0.118 0.041
FE1: 0.138 ?? 0.057 0.011
FE2: 0.161 0.106 0.013
FE3: -0.136 0.223 -0.011
FE4: -0.448? 0.231 -0.037
Probit on balanced panel of 941 districts (1998 to 2002).
Standard errors (S.E.) are robust for serial correlation in scores.
Estimations account for spatial error correlation.
Other covariates include district type dummies, city and suburb dummies, a Los Angeles
City Unified dummy, enrollment, student-teacher ratio, %minority students, % students
free lunch, and year effects.
Log of likelihood: −766.32 (weighting scheme C ), −764.85 (weighting scheme D).
a Average of estimated individual changes in probabilities.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
come. Thus, once the set of reference districts is appropriately defined, there
is strong evidence for the districts’ attitudes towards charter schools being
positively interdependent.
As an additional check for the significance of the differences in spatial ef-
fects, I estimated a simple probit with all exogenous explanatory variables
but without any interaction among equations for different districts. The log-
likelihood for this model is -766.54. Likelihood ratio (LR) tests reveal that
this value is not significantly different from the likelihoods of the spatial pro-
bit model if weighting schemes B or D are used. However, using weighting
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Table 6.4: Spatial probit, composite neighbor based on commuting patterns
Coefficient S.E. Slopea
Weighting scheme E : Weights do
not account for income differences
Spatial lag, φ 0.224 0.249 -
Charter in previous three years 0.493 ??? 0.121 0.040
FE1: 0.137 ?? 0.059 0.011
FE2: 0.164 0.109 0.013
FE3: -0.154 0.232 -0.012
FE4: -0.429? 0.237 -0.035
Weighting scheme F : Weights do
account for income differences
Spatial lag, φ 0.390 ??? 0.123 -
Charter in previous three years 0.484 ??? 0.112 0.041
FE1: 0.127 ?? 0.057 0.011
FE2: 0.148 0.106 0.013
FE3: -0.140 0.230 -0.012
FE4: -0.415? 0.236 -0.035
Probit on balanced panel of 941 districts (1998 to 2002).
Standard errors (S.E.) are robust for serial correlation in scores.
Estimations account for spatial error correlation.
Other covariates include district type dummies, city and suburb dummies, a Los Angeles
City Unified dummy, enrollment, student-teacher ratio, %minority students, % students
free lunch, and year effects.
Log of likelihood: −766.00 (weighting scheme E ), −763.30 (weighting scheme F ).
a Average of estimated individual changes in probabilities.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
scheme F, the LR test statistic is 6.49. With two degrees of freedom, this
is significantly different from zero at the 4 percent level. Hence, among the
weight matrices accounting for differences in median household income, the
matrix based on district-to-district commuting patterns clearly outperforms
the weight matrices where the definition of local educational markets rests
on county borders or contiguity of districts. Taken together, the results sug-
gest that the most appropriate way to define composite neighbors is to select
reference districts based on district-to-district commuting patterns and, at
the same time, to account for the degree of similarity in social and economic
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conditions.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, a distinctive disadvantage of limited depen-
dent variable models with interaction in latent variables is that it is not pos-
sible to derive from the parameter estimates an average partial effect for the
spatial lag. Hence, we cannot say anything about the magnitude of the ef-
fect of neighbors’ predispositions on the probability that districts establish
additional schools. The next subsection presents additional evidence on in-
teraction effects in district policies towards charter schools produced from a
model which does not suffer from this disadvantage.
6.5 Applying the instrumental variables probit
6.5.1 Estimation approach
Compared to the data on policy innovation used in Chapters 4 and 5, the
available information on the school districts’ charter school policies in Cali-
fornia is particularly rich. The analysis provided in this chapter makes use
of this information by presenting evidence on interdependencies among dis-
trict policies towards charter schools based on a second estimation approach,
the IV probit. In contrast to the panel data approach discussed before, the
dependent variable is constructed as an indicator taking value one if, in the
given school year, the school district operates at least one charter school.8
Since charter school closures are rare events, pooling observations from vari-
ous years would lead to strong serial correlation in the dependent variable. To
avoid any problem associated with such correlation, the identification of the
parameters relies exclusively on cross section variation.
8Recall that in Section 6.4, the dependent variable is an indicator for the establishment
of additional charter schools.
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The structural equation of the IV probit is written as
y∗i = φ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wijyj + xiβ + ui. (6.11)
As mentioned in Section 3.5, the linear combination of other districts’ policies
on the right hand side of Eq. (6.11) is endogenously determined. Spatially
transformed exogenous characteristics are used as instruments in the IV probit
estimation.
6.5.2 Data
As before, data for the years 1998-2002 are used to estimate the IV probit.
An advantage of using this data instead of data from earlier years is the
availability of data on standardized test scores at the district level. With data
on student test scores at hand, it is possible to control for the effect of average
student achievement on the willingness of local decision makers to experiment
with new policies.9 High school dropout rates are readily available and, in
general, could be used as a substitute. Note, however, that dropout rates are
not defined for about 60 percent of school districts in California which operate
only elementary schools.
Since the definition of the dependent variable differs from the one used
for the estimation of the finite spatial lag model, Table 6.5 shows descriptive
statistics for the indicator on charter school operation in California school
districts for the years 1998-2002. The numbers shown for the various cross-
sections are based on the samples of districts which are used in estimation.
9I did not use the test score data to control for student achievement when estimating
the finite spatial lag probit because the balanced panel approach would have suffered from
too many missing values in the test score variable. The reason for missing values in the test
score data is that information on student test scores is not available for a number of small
districts.
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Table 6.5: Summary statistics for dependent variable, 1998-2002
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mean 0.106 0.140 0.178 0.203 0.230
S.D. 0.308 0.348 0.382 0.403 0.421
Nob 925 926 918 915 912
Table 6.6: Summary statistics for covariates, 1998-2002 (Nob=4596)
Mean S.D. Min Max
Enrollmenta 5.71 10.3 0.036 142
Student-teacher ratio 19.9 2.69 7.17 50.6
% minority students 0.462 0.277 0 1.00
% students free lunch 0.430 0.261 0 1.00
Student achievementb 0.567 2.54 -6.32 9.77
Central city 0.137 0.344 0 1.00
Elementary school district 0.552 0.497 0 1.00
High school district 0.100 0.300 0 1.00
a In 1000 students.
b Deviation of average math test score from statewide average in percent.
The sample size varies over time due to variation in the total number of
school districts and missing values in covariates. Note that Los Angeles City
Unified has been excluded from the sample as an influential observation. It
served more than 740,000 students in 2002, which is more than five times the
number of students in the second largest district, San Diego City Unified.
Table 6.6 provides descriptive statistics for the covariates including the
test score variable which is supposed to control for student achievement. The
test score variable describes the deviation of student achievement from the
statewide average and is constructed as follows. First of all, for each grade
level the percent deviation of a district’s average score from the statewide
average is computed. The district’s average deviation is then determined as
the average deviation over all grade levels, weighted by the number of students
tested. I use the math test scores to derive the achievement variable because
they are available for all grade levels. Using reading scores gives very similar
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estimation results. Test score data are from the Standardized Testing and
Reporting (STAR) program of the California Department of Education.10
6.5.3 Results
In the following, estimation results for the IV probit model are presented. As
mentioned in Section 3.5, the IV probit can be estimated by conditional max-
imum likelihood (CML) and by two-stage procedures. It should be stressed
that results derived from two-stage procedures are somewhat difficult to in-
terpret since the coefficients are only estimated up to scale. Therefore, the
coefficients from Newey’s two-stage procedure should not be directly compared
to those derived from the CML approach. However, the two-step estimates
can still be used to test for significant relationships. The informational con-
tent of the estimate for the interaction coefficient is thus comparable to the
informational content of the corresponding estimate from the autoregressive
model.
The first set of results for the IV probit model displayed in Table 6.7 il-
lustrates the endogeneity problem associated with regressing an indicator for
innovation activity on the contemporaneous activity of a composite neigh-
bor. The table reports only results for 2002. The first two columns show
average partial effects, i.e. changes in probability associated with a change in
explanatory variables evaluated at sample means, from naive probit estimates
of Eq. (6.11). The average partial effects shown in the last two columns have
been estimated by IV probit using the CML approach. Neighbors’ innovation
activity is instrumented by neighbors’ exogenous characteristics as described
in Section 3.5.11 The weighting schemes used to define composite neighbors
10Available online at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta.
11Due to missing values for student test score averages, student achievement cannot
be used in constructing instruments. Therefore, composite neighbors’ enrollment, student-
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Table 6.7: Marginal changes in probabilities, 2002: Naive probit vs. IV probit
Estimation approach Probit IV probit (CML)
Weighting scheme C D C D
Neighbors’ innovations 0.295 ??? 0.307 ??? -0.085 0.057
(0.065) (0.058) (0.191) (0.181)
Enrollmenta 0.012 ??? 0.012 ??? 0.013 ??? 0.013 ???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Student-teacher ratio 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
% minority students -0.335??? -0.326??? -0.372??? -0.358???
(0.081) (0.081) (0.083) (0.084)
% students free lunch -0.303??? -0.299??? -0.349??? -0.334???
(0.104) (0.103) (0.106) (0.106)
Student achievement -0.061??? -0.059??? -0.063??? -0.062???
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Central city 0.068 0.064 0.084 ? 0.078 ?
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
Elementary school district -0.024 -0.025 -0.028 -0.027
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
High school district -0.042 -0.044 -0.064 -0.057
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
χ2 (1) - - 4.65 2.19
Test of exogeneity:
p-value - - 0.031 0.139
Standard errors of average partial effects in parentheses.
a In 1000 students.
? 10% significance level of underlying coefficient.
??? Idem., 1%.
are C (1st and 3rd column) and D (2nd and 4th column). Table 6.7 clearly
shows that naive estimates not accounting for the endogeneity of neighbors’
innovation activity can produce very misleading results. While the average
partial effects derived from a simple probit are highly significant, the esti-
mated positive impact of neighbors’ innovation activity vanishes once an IV
probit approach is used. Using a Wald test of exogeneity of neighbors’ innova-
tion activities,12 the null is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for the
teacher ratio, percent minority students, percent students free lunch, and weighted averages
of the dummy variables are used as instruments.
12See Wooldridge (2002) p. 476 for details on tests of exogeneity based on CML estimation
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estimation with weighting scheme C. Based on the IV probit with weighting
scheme D, the p-value is 0.139, which should still be interpreted as evidence
against the null of exogeneity. The results of IV probit estimations using the
cross-sections from other years and with weighting schemes A, B and E are
similar to those presented in Table 6.7. In all cases it turns out that a highly
significant effect of neighbors’ innovation activity derived from a naive probit
disappears once the simultaneity of yi and
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wijyj is accounted for. So far,
the findings confirm the results derived from the finite spatial lag model.
We now turn to results for weighting scheme F (interaction between indi-
cators for similar commuting patterns and the measure for similarity in house-
hold income). Table 6.8 presents coefficient estimates derived from Newey’s
two-stage procedure. The model has been estimated using the cross sections
for the years 1998-2002. The main result is that the probability for running at
least one charter school is significantly and positively related to charter school
policies in neighboring districts. However, based on the coefficients displayed
we cannot say anything about the magnitude of this effect. Note that the first
stage regression in the IV probit procedure produces significant coefficients for
at least six out of seven instruments. Hence, in all cross-sections the partial
correlation among the endogenous regressor and the instruments is strong.
It is more interesting to look at results showing the strength of the interac-
tion effect. Table 6.9 reports average partial effects evaluated at sample means
and the corresponding standard errors derived from the CML procedure. For
the sake of brevity, the underlying coefficients are omitted.
Again, the estimated effects of neighbors’ innovation activity show a posi-
tive sign in all estimations. Moreover, in all estimations, the null of no depen-
dence between neighbors’ innovation activity and a districts’ attitude towards
charter schools can be rejected at the one percent level of significance. The
of the IV probit.
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Table 6.8: Coefficient estimates derived from Newey’s two-stage procedure
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Neighbors’ innovations 2.98 ??? 3.12 ??? 1.93 ?? 1.92 ??? 1.86 ???
(1.06) (1.02) (0.754) (0.630) (0.601)
Enrollmenta 0.030 ??? 0.029 ??? 0.046 ??? 0.046 ??? 0.045 ???
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Student-teacher ratio 0.027 0.031 -0.011 0.001 0.013
(0.027) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
% minority students -0.748 ?? -0.785 ?? -0.915??? -0.960??? -0.990???
(0.349) (0.354) (0.327) (0.308) (0.314)
% students free lunch -0.653 -0.560 -1.30 ??? -1.40 ??? -1.09 ???
(0.488) (0.381) (0.419) (0.411) (0.384)
Student achievement -0.087 ? -0.085 ?? -0.188??? -0.203??? -0.200???
(0.048) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)
Central city 0.306 ? 0.483 ??? 0.419 ??? 0.368 ?? 0.192
(0.169) (0.158) (0.150) (0.150) (0.144)
Elementary school district -0.122 -0.147 -0.010 -0.012 -0.061
(0.146) (0.135) (0.130) (0.126) (0.121)
High school district -0.509 ?? -0.382 ? -0.223 ?? -0.215 ?? -0.205
(0.252) (0.215) (0.200) (0.195) (0.189)
Standard errors in parentheses.
a In 1000 students.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
average partial effects are between 0.434 and 0.587, indicating that a one per-
centage point increase in the share of neighbors operating at least one charter
school is estimated to increase the innovation probability by 0.43 to 0.59 per-
centage points. The school districts’ behavior toward charter schools is also
affected by a number of other factors. As expected, larger districts are more
likely to offer charter schools. Furthermore, districts with a higher share of
minority students are consistently less likely to operate charter schools. How-
ever, there is also weak evidence for the notion that charter schools are more
common in central urban areas, and that high school districts are somewhat
less inclined towards signing charter school contracts. Finally, there is strong
evidence suggesting that districts with lower student achievement are more
likely to run charter schools than districts with higher average test scores.
More successful schooling producers are less often experimenting with charter
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Table 6.9: Marginal changes in probabilities derived from IV probit (CML)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Neighbors’ innovations 0.456 ??? 0.587 ??? 0.434 ??? 0.477 ??? 0.507 ???
(0.165) (0.188) (0.164) (0.152) (0.163)
Enrollmenta 0.005 ??? 0.005 ??? 0.010 ??? 0.012 ??? 0.012 ???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Student-teacher ratio 0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
% minority students -0.111?? -0.145?? -0.207??? -0.239??? -0.272???
(0.052) (0.064) (0.073) (0.076) (0.086)
% students free lunch -0.100 -0.106 -0.297??? -0.350??? -0.302???
(0.072) (0.070) (0.092) (0.100) (0.104)
Student achievement -0.013? -0.016?? -0.043??? -0.051??? -0.055???
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Central city 0.054 0.111 ??? 0.111 ??? 0.103 ?? 0.056
(0.034) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.043)
Elementary school district -0.018 -0.028 -0.003 -0.003 -0.017
(0.022) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033)
High school district -0.058??? -0.059?? -0.046 -0.049 -0.052
(0.020) (0.026) (0.036) (0.040) (0.044)
χ2 (1) 1.21 1.29 0.42 0.68 0.04
Test of exogeneity:
p-value 0.271 0.256 0.515 0.408 0.833
Standard errors of average partial effects in parentheses.
a In 1000 students.
? 10% significance level of underlying coefficient.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
schools as a new production technology.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, a simple check of the robustness of the results
of the spatial probit is to run a 2SLS regression. Apart from its obvious lim-
itations, in many applications the linear probability model gives reasonable
estimates of the partial effects. Results for the 2SLS approach are presented in
Table 6.10. Although in four out of five estimations the coefficients of neigh-
bors’ innovation activity are somewhat smaller than the average partial effects
derived from the probit model, the results are remarkably similar. Again, the
impact of charter schools operating in neighboring districts is strongest in
1999. A one percentage point increase in the share of neighbors running char-
ter schools is estimated to increase the probability for the operation of such
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Table 6.10: Coefficient estimates derived from two-stage least squares
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Neighbors’ innovations 0.430 ?? 0.506 ??? 0.470 ??? 0.467 ??? 0.456 ???
(0.214) (0.160) (0.135) (0.123) (0.124)
Enrollmenta 0.008 ??? 0.007 ??? 0.011 ??? 0.011 ??? 0.011 ???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Student-teacher ratio 0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
% minority students -0.142?? -0.167??? -0.187??? -0.191??? -0.223???
(0.061) (0.056) (0.063) (0.063) (0.070)
% students free lunch -0.062 -0.061 -0.218??? -0.288??? -0.237??
(0.076) (0.068) (0.074) (0.084) (0.092)
Student achievement -0.012?? -0.014?? -0.034??? -0.042??? -0.044???
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Central city 0.049 0.107 ?? 0.100 ?? 0.088 ? 0.048
(0.037) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044)
Elementary school district -0.016 -0.029 -0.010 -0.009 -0.024
(0.024) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033)
High school district -0.066? -0.066 -0.038 -0.043 -0.044
(0.037) (0.043) (0.047) (0.049) (0.050)
Overidentifying F (6) 6.86 7.50 7.41 4.67 4.77
restrictions: p-value 0.334 0.277 0.285 0.587 0.574
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a In 1000 students.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
schools by 0.43 to 0.51 percentage points. It is also worth noting that in all
estimations the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at any reasonable
level. This finding suggests that we can have some confidence in the overall
set of instruments used to identify the spatial interaction in charter school
policies.
The results from the IV probit and the spatial LPM confirm the findings de-
rived from the finite spatial lag model presented in the previous section. Once
reference districts are defined according to commuting patterns and similarity
in household income, in selecting their charter school policies school boards
are found to be heavily affected by corresponding policies in reference districts.
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The empirical findings support the notion that strategic interaction among lo-
cal governments is an important driving force for the diffusion of new political
technologies.
Appendix to Chapter 6: Technical description of spatial
weights
In this chapter, I use six different weighting matrices to define a composite
neighbor for each district. Three of these matrices are based on a measure
for the similarity of median household income in 1999 (MHI, in 10,000 $). For
two districts i and j, it is computed as
w˜ij = exp(−|MHIi −MHIj|). (6.12)
In addition, three different measures for geographic proximity are used. In
the following, the construction of all weighting matrices W = {wij}Ni,j=1 is
described. Note that in all matrices wii = 0, and that weights are row-
standardized such that
∑
j wij = 1.
Weight matrix A (Affiliation to counties): Indicators cij for districts belonging
to the same county as i are used to compute the weights as wij = cij/
∑
j 6=i cij.
Weight matrix B (Interaction between indicators for affiliation to the same
county and the measure for similarity in household income): Weights are
based on interactions between indicators cij and w˜ij,
wij = cij w˜ij
 N∑
j=1
j 6=i
cij w˜ij

−1
. (6.13)
Weight matrix C (Geographic contiguity): Indicators bij for a shared border
between i and j or some common territory13 are used to compute the weights
13Elementary and high school districts in California often share some common territory,
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as wij = bij/
∑
j 6=i bij.
Weight matrix D (Interaction between contiguity indicators and the measure
for similarity in household income): Weights are based on interactions be-
tween contiguity indicators bij and w˜ij,
wij = bij w˜ij
 N∑
j=1
j 6=i
bij w˜ij

−1
(6.14)
Weight matrix E (Similarity of commuting patterns): First of all, a district-
to-district commuting matrix is computed. Since commuting data at district
level are unavailable, Census-designated places are assigned to school districts,
and Census data on place-to-place commuting in 1999 are used to compute
commuting flows between districts.14 As a next step, a distance δ for each
pair of districts is computed as the difference in commuting shares going to
all other districts,
δij =
N∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
∣∣∣∣∣ nik∑l 6=i,j nil − njk∑l 6=i,j njl
∣∣∣∣∣ , (6.15)
where nik is the number of commuters from i working in k. Note that by
construction, δ ∈ [0, 2]. By applying the distance-decay function exp(−δ),
distance measures are transformed into spatial weights. Since many δ’s are
close to the maximum of 2, it is useful to truncate the resulting weight matrix.
After row-standardization, this is done by a simple row-wise procedure: start-
ing with the smallest and moving on to the bigger, weights are set to zero as
i.e. they overlap. Of course, ‘contiguity’ indicators must account for that.
14Places and school districts are non-nested geographical structures. Often, commuting
to or from some place may be assigned to various school districts. I solve this problem
by proportionally assigning commuters to districts, where the proportion for each of the
districts involved is given by the share of the place’s area that is covered by the district.
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long as the sum of the remaining weights exceeds the threshold of 0.1. After
this procedure, the median number of non-zero weights is 22.
For 311 out of 941 districts in the sample, the imputed number of com-
muters is too low to obtain reliable weights.15 For these districts, I substitute
contiguity-based weights as described above.
Weight matrix F (Interaction between indicators for similar commuting pat-
terns and the measure for similarity in household income): In order to obtain
a matrix of indicators for similar commuting patterns, all strictly positive
weights in the commuting-based weight matrix are set to unity. Indicators are
then interacted with the measure for similarity in household income, w˜ij, and
the usual row-standardization is applied.
15I construct commuting-based weights only for districts with at least 50 out-commuters.
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Concluding remarks
This book sheds light on policy innovation in local jurisdictions. Based on
the example of US school districts it provides evidence on strategic interac-
tion among local governments in the adoption of new policies. The evidence
suggests that inter-jurisdictional competition is a driving force for political
change. The picture that emerges from the empirical chapters is one where
local governments actively engage in relative comparison and performance
evaluation across jurisdictions. This leads to a situation of policy diffusion,
where the implementation of a new policy in one jurisdiction triggers adop-
tions of that policy in other jurisdictions. While in the long run the ultimate
success or failure of the new policy will decide on its permanent implementa-
tion or abandonment, inter-jurisdictional competition seems to speed up the
process of initial adoption and experimentation with the new policy. While
the empirical investigations presented in the previous chapters, for practical
reasons, focus on situations where the adoption of some new policy at the lo-
cal level (i.e. the school districts) is triggered by political decisions at a higher
tier of government (i.e. the states) in a federal political system, the empirical
results suggest that inter-jurisdictional competition will also provide govern-
ments with incentives to independently experiment with innovative solutions
to various problems of governance. The material presented in this book is
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therefore supportive to the view of ‘laboratory federalism’ in the sense that a
large number of independent jurisdictions offers favorable conditions for find-
ing innovative solutions to difficult political problems.
Since the book (to the best of my knowledge) is the first systematical ap-
proach to deal empirically with the issue of strategic interaction and policy
innovation among local jurisdictions, it is worth noting that the findings are
derived from various empirical models and methods. The evidence on positive
spatial dependence in adoption decisions is fairly robust across models and
estimation strategies. Moreover, the evidence is based on two different local
policies, adoption of inter-district school choice and establishment of inde-
pendent public schools, so-called charter schools. Finally, the school districts
under investigation in the empirical parts of the book are from six US states:
California, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Ohio. The robust-
ness of the main findings across estimation techniques, policies, and samples
makes me believe that for understanding the behavior of local governments
in public sector innovation it is crucial to take into account interdependencies
among jurisdictions.
Given that local governments seem to interact with one another when it
comes to the implementation of new policies, quite naturally the question
arises whether it is possible to discriminate between competing theoretical
explanations for that interaction. In general, it seems to be promising to
exploit natural experiments to achieve identification in this context. One
could, for instance, argue that learning externalities are the driving force for
the observed interaction among local governments. To check the validity of
the argument, one could estimate the interaction effect in a situation where
learning is absent. A situation similar to the one the Michigan school districts
experienced in 1996, when the state initiated a voluntary inter-district choice
program, lends itself to test the learning hypothesis, since without any history
of adoptions there are no effects from learning by definition.
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To gain insight into the relative importance of information spillovers versus
resource flows and (re-)location decisions of households, it is useful to exploit
barriers to mobility to achieve identification. An example has been provided
in Chapter 4, where restrictions to the mobility of students in inter-district
transfers are exploited. The results show that the districts’ willingness to
participate in the school choice program was positively related to the level of
participation among neighboring districts because an environment more open
to inter-district transfers induces stronger competition for students, i.e. for
mobile resources.
The examples given above show that natural experiments are unequivocally
promising to learn more about the incentives for public sector innovation. In
many situations, however, there is not sufficient exogenous variation to achieve
identification, and convincing strategies for discriminating between competing
theoretical explanations for policy interdependencies are unavailable.
The issues discussed in this book are closely related to the long-lasting de-
bate whether political decentralization is beneficial or not. Instead of entering
the debate I would like to point to the fact that evidence on public sector
innovation in one setting (say decentralized decision making) is uninforma-
tive with regard to the benefits of decentralization as long as corresponding
evidence for the other setting (centralized decision making) is missing. Since
only one setting has been analyzed the book does not contribute to the decen-
tralization debate. It does, however, show that the forces which are necessary
to make decentralization the better choice with respect to the ability of the
public sector to produce and implement policy innovations are at work.
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